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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENCY PARADIGM 
Corporate law can seem obsessed with the internal operations of a 
corporation,1 often ignoring external realities. The underlying assumption 
is that if corporations are operating correctly internally, then they gener-
ate external benefits for markets, consumers, communities, and other 
stakeholders.2 Focusing on the internal operations can insulate corporate 
law theories, like the agency paradigm, from the changing economic re-
alities of how and why individuals invest.  
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 1. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 
805–806 (2011) (“The problems with the existing board structure are significant, however, and mat-
ter very much to the extent they impede the ability of corporate investors to constrain the agency 
costs inherent in the corporate form. The goal of reducing those agency costs has been the preoccu-
pation of corporate law and scholarship for at least the last eighty years.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. 
Research Paper Series 1-12, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1615838 (explaining director primacy theory as one view of how corporations are internally orga-
nized and the benefits of such a model). As Lucian Bebchuk explains, 
Some supporters of greater shareholder power might regard increases in “shareholder 
voice” and “corporate democracy” as intrinsically desirable. I should therefore stress at 
the outset that I do not view increasing shareholder power as an end in and of itself. Ra-
ther, effective corporate governance, which enhances shareholder and firm value, is the 
objective underlying my analysis. 
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 843 
(2005). For a definition of stakeholders, see infra note 251. 
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The agency paradigm is premised on two actors: managers and 
shareholders.3 It aims to prevent managers from acting in their own in-
terests rather than in the interests of shareholders.4 It seeks to reduce con-
flicts of interest by striking the appropriate balance between the authority 
of managers and the interests of shareholders.5 The larger the pool of 
shareholders, however, the more attenuated the shareholders’ link to 
managers becomes because the voice or vote of each shareholder is di-
luted relative to the size of the whole pool.6 For example, one sharehold-
er’s vote out of ten total votes has more potential influence than one 
shareholder’s vote out of 10,000 or 10 million votes. Berle and Means 
captured this problem with their famous phrase: “the separation of own-
ership from control.”7 
From the agency paradigm was born the corporate law litmus test 
of whether corporate actions serve the interests of shareholders.8 The 
                                                 
 3. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith et al., Private Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 125, 135–36 (2011) (discussing the role of shareholders and corporate managers in the 
agency paradigm and recent proposals to achieve the appropriate power balance). 
 4. See, e.g., WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 2096.30 (2011) (discussing the separation of ownership and control as a founda-
tional theory in corporate law). 
 5. This tension between the owners and who is in control of a corporation is at the heart of 
corporate law debates and is a starting point from which many theories diverge. Lynn A. Stout, 
Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 BUS. 
LAW. 1435, 1445 (“The principal−agent model has so dominated academic discussions of corporate 
law . . . .”); see also Jennifer S. Taub, Able But Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to 
Advocate for Shareholders’ Rights, 34 J. CORP. L. 843, 846 (2009) (“[M]uch of corporate govern-
ance work focuses on that power balance between management and owners, and seeks to find ways 
to enhance shareholders’ rights. Or, the work looks to the failure of the board of directors to look out 
for shareholders.”). 
 6. Clifford Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 1377, 1380 (2009) (discussing how increasingly dispersed ownership weakens shareholder 
rights and exacerbates problems such as shareholder passivity). 
 7. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 4 (1932); see also FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 2096.30 (discussing the separation of own-
ership and control as a foundational theory in corporate law). 
 8. Scholars disagree, however, about how to best achieve this end. Theories run the gamut from 
trying to empower shareholders’ voices in corporate governance to limiting restrictions on manage-
ment’s right to control the corporation. 
Measures that focus on enhancing and enforcing the rights of shareholders fall into the sharehold-
er primacy camp: 
Shareholder primacy theory includes two bedrock principles: (1) maximizing long-term 
shareholder value is the only legitimate objective of the corporation, and (2) designing 
ways to assist shareholders in exerting control through their powers, including the power 
to vote at annual meetings, will minimize the agency costs that result from the separation 
of ownership from control in publicly traded and diffusely held corporations. It is a direct 
outgrowth of agency theory. 
J. W. Verret, Treasury, Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. 
ON REG. 283, 318 (2010). See generally Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 850; Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., 
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agency paradigm, however, relies on a traditional image of a sharehold-
er—a shareholder that is a direct (although likely very small) owner in an 
individual company.9 In other words, the agency paradigm conceptual-
izes “shareholder” to mean an individual investor who buys stock in a 
publicly traded company, like IBM, one of the case study companies dis-
cussed in this Article.10 
                                                                                                             
Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 
(1996) (“A central tenet of shareholder activism holds that shareholder proposals ameliorate the 
shareholder–manager agency conflict and pressure managers to adopt value-increasing policies.”). 
Under a director primacy theory, the board of directors is in the best position to monitor the com-
pany because of its interest in protecting and preserving their jobs and therefore the company as a 
whole. In light of director incentives to efficiently monitor the company and maximize profits, under 
a director primacy theory, directors should have greater control over the corporation with little 
shareholder interference in the form of votes, disclosures, etc. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1752 (2006); Verret, 
supra, at 321–22. For a description of a nexus-of-contracts theory organization view of the firm, 
which serves, in part, the director primacy theory, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Direc-
tor Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 775–84 (2006) (describing the corpo-
ration as “a legal fiction representing the nexus of a set of contracts among the multiple factors of 
production provided by the organization’s various constituencies,” which minimizes the role of 
shareholder ownership). 
These two ends of the spectrum can be generally summed up as the shareholder primacy and di-
rector primacy camps, with an understanding that there are many alternative and competitive theo-
ries that fall in between (and on other axes within the same debate). Id. (describing shareholder 
primacy and director primacy theories along with contractarian theory, agency law theory, progres-
sive corporate law, and a team production theory of corporate law); see also Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 250–53 (1999); 
Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the Share-
holder–Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59 (2010). 
 9. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 5, at 1444–45 (“According to the principal–agent model, corpo-
rations are the ‘property’ of shareholders, who are the ‘principals’ who hire directors and officers to 
act as ‘agents’ on their behalf. An important implication of the principal−agent model is that share-
holders are, or ought to be, the sole residual claimants in corporations, entitled to each and every 
penny of profit left over after the firm’s contractual obligations have been met.”). 
The small, direct owner in a corporation is often referred to as a “retail investor.” See generally 
Barbara Black, Arbitration of Investors’ Claims Against Issuers: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 125 (2012) (discussing the difficulty of small “retail” investors in 
arbitrating claims); Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105 
(2009) (discussing the role of the retail investor); Jeffrey Ross, A Brief Overview of the U.S. DOL’s 
Proposed Re-Definition of Investment Advice, in RECENT CHANGES IN EMPLOYEE BENEFITS AND 
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Melissa Silvanic ed., 2012), 2012 WL 698041, at *6 (discussing the 
impact of the proposed changes on “retail investors”). 
 10. In this Article, I discuss three case study companies: Wal-Mart, IBM, and WellPoint. Using 
publicly available information, I ranked the corporations by revenue and created a combined ranking 
of global economies (country by GDP and corporation by gross revenue). See infra Table 7: Top 
Economies of the World in 2010; Table 8: Top 100 Companies by Revenue in 2010. To highlight the 
argument advanced in this Article and the issues raised in Part III, I gathered additional data regard-
ing the top (Wal-Mart), middle (IBM), and lowest (WellPoint) U.S.-based and publicly traded com-
panies included in the top 100 list. See infra Part III. In addition, I aggregated data for the top eleven 
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Currently, indirect owners like mutual fund investors are not direct-
ly included in the agency paradigm’s conceptualization of shareholders. 
For example, a Wal-Mart employee invests in a BlackRock mutual fund 
as a part of a 401(k).11 The BlackRock mutual fund is invested in IBM 
and is therefore the shareholder in the company (and the agency para-
digm), not the employee−investor—even though she bears the ultimate 
risk of ownership. Mutual fund ownership thus augments the distance 
between the “owners” and the management, and complicates the applica-
tion of the agency paradigm to questions of modern investment.12 Conse-
quently, the agency paradigm should be modernized to incorporate the 
unique identity and interests of these investors, a class of investors 
termed herein as the citizen shareholders. 
A. Forces of Change 
With 90 million U.S. citizens invested in mutual funds,13 the tradi-
tional concept of the individual, direct shareholder is divorced from eco-
nomic realities for the majority of investors.14 Investment trends, and the 
conditions that will likely perpetuate them, are changing who is invest-
ing, in what, and why.15 The most dominant of these trends is retirement 
                                                                                                             
mutual funds and describe in further detail their role in defined contribution plans and the arguments 
relating to the interconnectedness of investments. See infra Table 4: Top Mutual Fund Funds with 
200,000 Shares or More in Case Study Companies (2010); Table 9 Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and 
Government Institutional Investors in Case Study Companies. Data tables not included in the main 
body of the Article are provided in an Appendix at the end. 
 11. To illustrate the distinction between direct and mutual fund shareholders, as well as other 
terms relied on in this Article, consider the following example. Wal-Mart offers its securities (shares 
or stock) for sale on a publicly traded exchange (e.g., NYSE or NASDAQ). An individual, direct 
shareholder owns shares in Wal-Mart. A mutual fund investor, by contrast, owns shares in a mutual 
fund, say for example BlackRock. The mutual fund is the entity that owns stock in Wal-Mart, what I 
refer to as the “underlying” company throughout this Article. 
 12. See, e.g., PIERRE-YVES GOMEZ & HARRY KORINE, ENTREPRENEURS AND DEMOCRACY, A 
POLITICAL THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 143–44 (2008) (“Owners of shares, represented 
by intermediary financial institutions and corporations, operate at a great distance from each other, 
incomparable with the situation that prevailed for most of the twentieth century.”). 
 13. INV. CO. INST., 2011 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK 80 (51st ed. 2011) www.ici.org/ 
pdf/2011_factbook.pdf [hereinafter ICI 2011 FACTBOOK]. Mutual fund ownership is over 40% of the 
population of this country, compare with the 6% of the country’s population invested in mutual 
funds in 1980. Id. at 79. 
14. For those who subscribe to a shareholder-centric vision of corporate governance, fo-
cusing just on direct shareholders ignores how much capitalism’s environment has 
changed . . . . While working people through their savings today hold the majority of 
stock in the most powerful enterprises in the world, they are not even mere legal owners 
anymore. 
Taub, supra note 5, at 847. 
 15. The data indicate that primarily middle-class citizens are investing in the stock markets, 
primarily through mutual funds: 
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investment through employer-sponsored defined contribution plans like 
the 401(k).16 This trend has created a class of investors who have limited 
choice about entering the market and whose retirement savings bear the 
risk of the markets without the traditional rights associated with such 
ownership. These three facts—mutual funds, employer-sponsored plans, 
and retirement saving—fundamentally alter the landscape of individual 
investments. Part II discusses in detail investment trends and their affect 
on the agency paradigm; a summary of those main arguments is provided 
below. 
First, for a growing group of investors, participation in the stock 
market can no longer be thought of as a voluntary endeavor for those 
with discretionary or extra funds.17 Rather, it has become a default form 
of retirement savings, a personally important task that is crucial to indi-
vidual and social financial stability.18 While investors do have choice 
                                                                                                             
The majority of U.S. households owning mutual funds had moderate incomes. One-
quarter of mutual fund-owning households had household incomes of less than $50,000; 
20 percent had household incomes between $50,000 and $74,999; 19 percent had in-
comes between $75,000 and $99,999; and the remaining 36 percent had incomes of 
$100,000 or more. The median household income of mutual fund-owning households 
was $80,000. 
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 82. 
 16. Taub, supra note 5, at 847, 851 (describing institutional investors as representing state and 
union pension funds along with mutual funds, but noting the investment in mutual funds through 
employer-sponsored retirement “channels” was the predominant form of investment). The Invest-
ment Company Institute defines a defined contribution plan as “[a]n employer-sponsored retirement 
plan, such as a 401(k) plan or a 403(b) plan, in which contributions are made to individual partici-
pant accounts. Depending on the type of DC plan, contributions may be made by the employee, the 
employer, or both.” ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 216. For the purposes of this Article, 
401(k) plans will be the focus of the collected data and therefore the subject of greatest discussion 
herein. The assertions made in this Article, however, include all defined contribution plans. 
 17. The experience of most readers probably parallels those of the “majority of investors” de-
scribed herein. An employee is automatically enrolled in a 401(k) plan upon hiring, selects a few 
funds from fifteen to twenty-five participating funds (see, for example, infra Part III) in which to 
invest and keeps his or her investments in the employer’s plan, while perhaps making allocation 
adjustments to reflect changing retirement goals or the performance of a particular fund. Such an 
investor had little choice in making the initial investment and little choice regarding the funds into 
which he or she will invest (as compared with the option to invest directly in any publicly traded 
company, which is the assumption in the traditional agency paradigm). 
For a discussion of automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans, see Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market 
Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 469, 481 (2001); see also Paul Schott Stevens, 
President & CEO, Inv. Co. Inst., Speech at the Ayco Summer InnerCircle Benefits and Compensa-
tion Conference: How the 401(k) System Is Succeeding (July 28, 2011) [hereinafter Stevens, ICI 
Speech], available at http://www.ici.org/pressroom/speeches/11_pss_ayco_401k. 
 18. “Mutual funds play a key role in achieving both the long- and short-term savings goals of 
U.S. households. In 2010, 74 percent of mutual fund-owning households indicated that their primary 
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with regard to investment options within a plan and can even opt out of 
participating in defined contribution plans altogether, empirical and an-
ecdotal evidence suggests that a majority of investors are reluctant and 
feel ill-equipped to use those options.19 Such an investor has little choice 
in making the initial investment and little choice regarding the funds into 
which she will invest, particularly when compared to the option to invest 
directly in any publicly traded company, which is the assumption in the 
traditional agency paradigm. Investing through employer-sponsored de-
fined contribution plans alters the investor’s choice to enter the market, 
as well as the investor’s choice to exit the market, which will be limited 
by the available investment alternatives within the employer’s plan.20 
Exit rights,21 like voting, are important arrows in investors’ quiver as the 
rights to withdraw money and leave facilitate investors’ influence of cor-
porate managers through the threat of falling share prices.22 
Second, the number of investors in this class is at a tipping point, 
outpacing the growth in any other category of investment and likely to 
                                                                                                             
financial goal for their fund investments was saving for retirement.” ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 
13, at 84. 
 19. “[W]hile the employee makes the selection at the fund level, the employer (i.e., corporate 
management) makes the fund family selection. Corporate management who, acting as plan sponsor, 
influences which fund families will be among the investment choices.” Taub, supra note 5, at 876. 
Study after study shows that Americans possess little financial acumen, both generally 
and when it comes to investing. Moreover, with respect to 401(k) investors, there is par-
ticular reason for concern. In a recent survey, about 50% rated themselves as “not very 
experienced” or “not at all experienced” in investing. Perhaps this is because 401(k) par-
ticipants do not relish the opportunity to invest. The same survey labeled 62% of 401(k) 
participants as “accidental investors,” because they “typically invest only [in their 
401(k)s], they don’t enjoy investing, and they don’t pay much attention to what they in-
vest in. 
Jeff Schwartz, Rethinking 401(k)s, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 53, 55 (2012) (citing ALLIANCE 
BERNSTEIN, INSIDE THE MINDS OF PLAN PARTICIPANTS 5 (2009)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Empir-
ically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1393 (2011) (noting that after automatic en-
rollment, 401(k) participation increased even though opting out of it was easy). 
 20. See, e.g., John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and 
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 88 (2010) (“Mutual funds differ 
from ordinary companies in all three categories of shareholder rights, but they are most unusual in 
terms of exit.”). 
 21. For example, the issue of compelled speech for dissenting shareholders was rejected as a 
concern under the majority holding of Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), because an 
unsatisfied shareholder could remedy the problem by selling her shares and reinvesting elsewhere. 
“If and when shareholders learn that a corporation has been spending general treasury money on 
objectionable electioneering, they can divest.” Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing against the 
majority’s rationale that the secondary market for securities protects shareholders from the threat of 
compelled political speech through corporate political independent expenditures). 
 22. See, e.g., Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 711, 755 (2005) (describing how shareholder exit after the lock-up period with stock offered in 
an initial public offering can cause a drop in stock price). 
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soon include most working Americans.23 Yet, this group has no direct 
role in the agency paradigm.24 Consider again, for example, the Wal-
Mart employee with 401(k) investments in BlackRock mutual funds. 
BlackRock, not the employee−investor, votes in IBM director elections 
and exercises other shareholder rights. While the mutual fund investor is 
represented by the BlackRock fund managers, there are legitimate criti-
cisms of managers’ ability to represent the interests of individual mutual 
fund investors.25 
Third, what the average American investor “owns” through their 
securities holdings26 is very different from what a controlling-interest or 
blockholding shareholder27 in an individual company owns.28 For exam-
                                                 
 23. See infra Part II.B. “The U.S. mutual fund market—with $11.8 trillion in assets under 
management at year-end 2010—remained the largest in the world, accounting for 48 percent of the 
$24.7 trillion in mutual fund assets worldwide.” ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 22. 
 24. For a discussion of mutual fund investments and the voting and disclosure rules to which 
they are subject, see Mary Joan Hoene et al., Practising Law Inst. CLE, Background: Mutual Funds 
and Exchange-Traded Funds 2011 (June 9, 2011). 
 25. The efficacy of mutual fund managers to represent mutual fund investors’ interests is a 
subject of continued study and debate. See, e.g., Taub, supra note 5, at 844–45; see also William A. 
Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 
80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (“This Article argues that the industry’s faults can be found in 
the idiosyncratic structure of mutual funds, a structure that exacerbates the ability of managers to 
wield substantial power and to use that power to extract rents both overtly and surreptitiously from 
shareholders.”). For a more detailed discussion of the criticisms regarding mutual fund management 
representation of investors’ interests, see infra notes 119–25. 
 26. See, e.g., GOMEZ & KORINE, supra note 12, at 144 (“This [separation of ownership from 
control] is a second important element in the transformation of the nature of the ownership of the 
public corporation: for many funds, attachment to a particular corporation as an owner is no longer 
the primary motivation for holding shares. Today’s shareholder can be an investor who diversifies 
his/her portfolio sufficiently to minimize risk and cares little about the raison d’être or fate of any 
individual corporation; he/she is primarily interested not even in a corporation’s profits, but in a rise 
in its share price to improve the performance of the investment portfolio.”). 
 27. A blockholder is an individual shareholder, trust, or the composite shares held by a single 
family that has a large ownership interest in a public company. See generally Holderness, supra note 
6. “[M]inority control, may be said to exist when an individual or small group hold a sufficient stock 
interest to be in a position to dominate a corporation through their stock interest. Such a group is 
often said to have ‘working control’ of the company.” BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 80. 
As the size of the corporation increases along with the dispersion of stock ownership, there is a 
decrease in the size of the controlling interest sufficient to influence the company. Id.; see also 
Sanjai Bhagat et al., Relational Investing and Firm Performance, 27 J. FIN. RES. 1, 9 (2004) (defin-
ing blockholding shareholders and documenting their stake in U.S. companies from 1987 to 1990); 
Holderness, supra note 6 (discussing the presence of blockholding shareholders in U.S. public com-
panies and concluding that ownership in the U.S. is less dispersed than assumed). 
28. Another fault line separating shareholders is the extent to which their portfolios are 
diversified. James Hawley and Andrew Williams have advanced the argument that the in-
stitutionalization of U.S. shareholdings created a new category of shareholders, “univer-
sal owners,” who are characterized by their holdings across a wide spectrum of the stock 
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ple, the Wal-Mart employee’s retirement account that is invested in 
BlackRock mutual funds benefits from sustained market stability and 
performance, rather than firm-specific returns like IBM’s daily stock 
price. Even though studies indicate that investors may not care about 
market performance as a whole, they benefit from it.29 
The changing investment landscape alters key assumptions of the 
agency paradigm and supports supplementing the shareholder definition 
with the citizen shareholder identity. 
Part III introduces a separate but related argument for why the 
shareholder identity should be expanded to include the “citizen share-
holder” and acknowledges growing corporate spaces as another force 
contributing to the new economic reality of investments. By corporate 
spaces, I mean both the size of corporations and the public functions they 
perform in modern society. As to the first, both the growth of corporate 
revenues—influenced in part by the influx of capital from the growing 
number of investors30—and the concentration of wealth in corporations31 
demonstrate increasing size. Additionally, there is a level of intercon-
nectedness of investments. For example, BlackRock, a Wal-Mart 401(k) 
plan participant, is invested in Wal-Mart, IBM, and WellPoint. And those 
companies and their mutual-fund participants are also invested in the 
case study companies.32 The trend of concentration of wealth is also mir-
rored by mutual funds so that the largest mutual funds control an increas-
                                                                                                             
market. Because their investment portfolios are so diversified, universal owners are 
thought of as “owning the economy.” . . . Universal owners can be contrasted with undi-
versified shareholders, such as inside shareholders and founding-family shareholders, 
who have their wealth disproportionately invested in a given company. 
Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism about Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 583–
84 (2006) (citing JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY CAPITALISM 
21 (2000)). 
 29. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 28; Stout, supra note 5. 
 30. See Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Voting of Portfolio Shares: Why Not Disclose?, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1427–28 (2002) (describing the “influx of individual investors into the 
capital markets”); see also Floyd Norris, As Corporate Profits Rise, Workers’ Income Declines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/business/workers-
wages-chasing-corporate-profits-off-the-charts.html (discussing the record profits of corporations as 
rising to 14% of the national GDP). 
 31. For example, looking at 2010 data, the top 5% of companies whose primary listing is on an 
American stock exchange accounted for “70% ($10.6 trillion) of the market value and 90% ($765 
billion) of the total profit . . . .” They Are the 5%, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.econo 
mist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/11/corporate-wealth. 
 32. See infra Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government Institutional Investors in 
Case Study Companies; see also Figure 2: Interconnectedness between Mutual Funds, Corporate 
401(k) Plans, and Corporate Sponsor of the Plan. 
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ingly large market share of managed assets.33 The level of investment 
interconnectedness between the top public companies and mutual funds, 
which provide the securities invested in by a majority of Americans, fur-
ther supports supplementing the traditional image of the individual, di-
rect shareholder with the citizen shareholder, whose interests lie with 
market performance. 
The scope of corporations also references the public functions per-
formed by corporations. Examples of public functions include providing 
health care insurance, providing vehicles for individual retirement sav-
ings, and participating in political speech.34 Private entities providing 
increasingly public functions affect the interests of investors and non-
investors alike, further demonstrating the need for a shareholder image 
that accurately captures the relationship between economic, social, and 
political interests implicated by market performance and stability. The 
phrase citizen shareholder is intended to capture, in part, the juxtaposi-
tion of private entities performing public functions and the increasing 
link between corporate performance and social stability. As economic 
interests become inextricably intertwined with the social and political, 
the agency paradigm requires language that reflects the bifurcated inter-
ests of investors as shareholders and citizens alike.35 
B. The Citizen Shareholder 
Expanding the shareholder identity in the agency paradigm to in-
clude citizen shareholders36 better captures the entire scope of interests 
implicated by modern investment practices, and is discussed in detail in 
Part IV. In previous articles, I introduced the phrase citizen shareholder 
                                                 
33. In this past decade, however, the percentage of industry assets at larger fund com-
plexes has increased. The share of assets managed by the largest 25 firms increased to 74 
percent in 2010 from 68 percent in 2000. In addition, the share of assets managed by the 
largest 10 firms in 2010 was 53 percent, up from the 44 percent share managed by the 
largest 10 firms in 2000. 
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 23. 
 34. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The 
Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 852 (2010). 
35. Many [scholars] have concluded that the principal–agent model fails in important 
ways to capture the economic and legal realities of public corporations. Many also have 
begun to suspect that, quite apart from doubts about the market’s efficiency, the idea that 
directors best serve shareholders by ruthlessly maximizing share price rests on a narrow, 
unrealistic, and impoverished view of what is truly in “shareholders’ interests.” 
Stout, supra note 5, at 1445. 
 36. Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 577 (describing the different “flavors” of shareholders and 
their myriad of interests in investments). 
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to describe the connection between economic and political interests when 
corporations engage in political speech. I use it in this Article for similar 
as well as newly expanded reasons. Citizen shareholder is meant to cap-
ture the growing group of investors who enter the market through em-
ployer-sponsored defined contribution plans by investing in mutual 
funds, whose choices are structurally constrained, and who bear the risks 
of the market without the benefit of ownership rights extended to tradi-
tional shareholders. Identifying this group as “citizen” shareholders 
speaks to the commonality of these investors in how and why they enter 
the market. It also speaks to the interconnection between market perfor-
mance and individual financial security, as well as to the fusing of eco-
nomic interests with social and political interests.37 Finally, it speaks to 
the ubiquity of both corporations in society and individual investment in 
them. By giving name to this class of investors, it is my intention to fo-
cus corporate law debates on these investors’ interests, as well as 
acknowledge the personally and socially vital role that their investments 
serve. 
Citizen shareholder is a metaphor—a language device—used to 
both conceptualize and convey the facts that a majority of Americans are 
corporate shareholders, that the 90 million Americans who are indirect 
investors benefit from market performance as a whole, and that corporate 
spaces are growing so that the links between the economic and the social, 
the public and the private, and the corporation and the individual are ever 
increasing. Corporate law analysis under the traditional agency paradigm 
is outdated because of the current, limited definition of shareholder. It 
must be expanded if the paradigm is to remain relevant to modern in-
vestment practices. Unless the agency paradigm is expanded to include 
the citizen shareholder identity, a growing majority of modern investors 
                                                 
 37. In this Article, I discuss the interrelationship between corporate action and the affect on 
social and political interests. This assertion is observational and is not to suggest that individual 
investors are aware of or presently care about the consequences of this interrelationship. For exam-
ple, the current debate about corporate political spending highlights how economic and so-
cial/political interests are intertwined. The debate cannot be cast as solely a corporate, economic, or 
political one. Rather, the debate involves all of these interests. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Rob-
ert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) (dis-
cussing the distinction between ordinary business decisions and corporate political speech/spending 
decisions and examining legislative options in light of the Supreme Court opinion in Citizens Unit-
ed); see also William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Ori-
gins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 102–03 (2008) (discussing the 
origins and evolutions of Berle’s view of the role of corporations in light of changes in the economy, 
politics, and policies); Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations that Perform Public Functions: 
Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (2000) (identifying ways in which the pub-
lic/private dichotomy falls away, for example, when private corporations “contract with govern-
ments to manage prisons and public schools, or distribute welfare benefits”). 
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are left without a meaningful voice in an increasingly important sphere 
of society. 
II. A DYING PARADIGM AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE 
CITIZEN SHAREHOLDER 
A. Declining Dominance: The Shelf-Life of the Traditional 
Shareholder Identity 
Traditional corporate law literature, beginning with Berle and 
Means, discusses the problem of the modern corporation as the distance 
between managers and stockholders, or the separation of ownership from 
control.38 With one phrase, Berle and Means captured the agency prob-
lems of diverse and dispersed ownership with a powerful image. The 
separation of ownership and control, the issue at the heart of most corpo-
rate law debates and developments in reporting and regulation,39 speaks 
to the inherent agency problem40 that arises when those who govern the 
company are not the owners. Therefore, laws and governance standards 
seek to identify ways to properly align the interests of the managers 
(those in control) with those of the shareholders (the owners).41 
                                                 
 38. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 4 (describing the public corporation as “a corporation in 
which a large measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the multipli-
cation of owners”); see also id. at 90–118 (identifying the forms of control within a corporation and 
discussing the evolution of control being held by the owners to one dominated by management con-
trol). 
 39. “Corporations address passive owners’ vulnerability to mismanagement through such de-
vises as monitoring of management by independent directors, shareholder voting backed by federal 
proxy and disclosure rules, fiduciary duties, and takeovers. These devices not only cannot make 
managers perfectly loyal to owners’ interests, but also could generate their own costs.” LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 193 (2009); see also id. at 195–207 (discussing differ-
ent features of corporate governance and its shortcomings). 
40. In publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, the interests of management 
do not fully overlap with those of shareholders, and management thus cannot be automat-
ically counted on to take actions that would serve shareholder interests. As a result, agen-
cy costs that reduce shareholder value might arise. Without adequate constraints and in-
centives, management might divert resources through excessive pay, self-dealing, or oth-
er means; reject beneficial acquisition offers to maintain its independence and private 
benefits of control; over-invest and engage in empire-building; and so forth. Adequate 
governance arrangements, however, can provide constraints and incentives that reduce 
deviations from shareholder-value maximization. 
Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 850; see also RIBSTEIN, supra note 39, at 193 (“The modern corporation, 
however, is far from ideal. A key problem lies in how the corporate form deals with the agency costs 
of delegating control to powerful managers.”). 
 41. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 6 (“The separation of ownership from control produces a 
condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and 
where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear.”). Where the 
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Corporate law allocates voting rights on certain issues to sharehold-
ers, as well as rights to receive information and inspect books and rec-
ords.42 Together, these rights are referred to as “corporate democracy,” 
reflecting the representative position that management holds with share-
holders. Corporate democracy and the remedy of selling shares when 
dissatisfied with corporate performance or policy are the primary rights 
assigned to shareholders. The balancing point reflected by these rights 
and the specific mechanisms developed under each were constructed 
with the traditional image of a direct shareholder in mind, pitting share-
holder interests against management authority.43 
Berle and Means discussed the relationship between the size of cor-
porations and the diverse and dispersed ownership of public companies 
as eroding the foundational assumptions protecting shareholder rights, 
and raised the red flag of accountability that continues to perplex schol-
ars and lawmakers alike.44 The agency paradigm, which continues to 
serve as a foundation of corporate law, was already weakened in 1932 
when realities of investment were beginning to outgrow the concept of 
the traditional shareholder.45 
An identifiable shareholder with discrete and discernible interests in 
a specific company is no longer the model that fits the majority of Amer-
ican investors.46 While there are blockholders47 in public corporations 
                                                                                                             
interests of shareholders significantly diverge from those of the directors and officers of a corpora-
tion, “corporate law rules impose special requirements designed to address this conflict.” Bebchuk & 
Jackson, supra note 37, at 90. Executive compensation regulations “say on pay” is an example of 
how corporate rules seek to align management and shareholder interests. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211 (shareholder voting rights), 220 (shareholder ac-
cess and inspection rights) (2011). 
 43. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or 
Reality, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 870–77 (discussing shareholder voting rights developments intended to 
empower the shareholder to serve as a meaningful check on the authority of corporate managers); 
see also Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 885 (2010) (“The scope of shareholder voting power has also increased.”). 
 44. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 80. “The fundamental problem with diffuse ownership is 
that a joint owner will not have the same incentives as either a manager or a monitor as a sole owner 
will have. The more fractured the ownership becomes, the greater this free-rider problem becomes.” 
Holderness, supra note 6, at 1379. 
 45. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 43, at 879–80 (describing the rising presence of institutional 
investors and tracking their development, beginning in the 1920s). 
 46. See Stout, supra note 5, at 1445–47 (rejecting the traditional “principal–agent model [that] 
assumes that shareholders in public corporations are a single, homogenous mass with a uniform 
interest in raising share price,” and arguing for a view of investors as highly diversified and whose 
interests may include factors outside of economic returns); see also Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 
578–93 (arguing that there are five main distinctions among shareholders that make it impossible for 
the law to characterize shareholders as having discernible and harmonized interests); William B. 
Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1083, 1092 (1999) (describing investors as having different “flavors”). 
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and a small number of investors own a large percentage of securities,48 
this is not the reality for the over 90 million Americans invested in the 
stock market through mutual funds.49 
The identity of the individual shareholder is ill-equipped to repre-
sent the interests or to protect the rights of modern investors.50 To reach 
their conclusions, Berle and Means compiled data on corporate owner-
ship and control, and drew larger conclusions about the then-current 
function and conceptualization of corporations.51 Infusing the agency 
paradigm with external economic realities— where a majority of Ameri-
cans are invested in securities and where corporations play expanding 
roles in modern society—requires adopting a shareholder identity, like 
that of the citizen shareholder, capable of reflecting these new realities. 
B. Recognizing a New Reality: The Evolution of American Investment 
Given the number of American households52 invested in the stock 
market, the economic rights53 of citizens are intimately tied to how cor-
                                                                                                             
 47. Holderness, supra note 6, at 1377 (“This article offers evidence on the ownership concen-
tration at a representative sample of U.S. public firms. Ninety-six percent of these firms have 
blockholders; these blockholders in aggregate own an average 39% of the common stock.”); see also 
Bhagat et al., supra note 27, at 9 (identifying the number of outside investors holding 10% or more 
of the company’s securities during the study period of 1987−1990). 
 48. For example, the top 10% of U.S. households (measured by income) owned 50.8% of the 
stocks held by households, and the next 10% (of ranked households) owned 29.3% of equity assets. 
FED. RESERVE SYS., SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES (2009), available at http://federalreserve 
.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2009p.htm; see also Share of Stock Holdings Held by Top 10% Has Barely 
Budged in Last Two Decades, ECON. POLICY INST., (2011), http://stateofworkingamerica.org/charts/ 
distribution-of-stock-market-wealth-by-wealth-class-1962-2007/ (measuring investment asset con-
centration among U.S. households from 1962 to 2007). 2007 data collected by the Federal Reserve 
that separates out ownership of stocks from mutual funds suggest that there is significant concentra-
tion of wealth among consumer mutual fund investors as well. The top 1% of mutual fund owners 
held 46.7% of mutual fund assets, and the 90–99 percentile controlled another 40% of mutual fund 
assets. Families in the top 50–90 wealth percentile owned 11.6% of mutual fund assets. ARTHUR B. 
KENNICKELL, PONDS AND STREAMS: WEALTH AND INCOME IN THE U.S., 1989 TO 2007, FED. 
RESERVE BD., FIN. AND ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES, DIVS. OF RESEARCH & STATISTICS & 
MONETARY AFFAIRS, PAPER 2009-13, 63 fig.A3a: Amounts and shares of net worth and compo-
nents; by net worth percentile group; 2007 SCF, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ 
feds/2009/200913/200913pap.pdf. 
 49. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 80. 
 50. For a brief discussion of the limitations of mutual fund managers as a sufficient representa-
tion of mutual fund investors’, or citizen shareholders’, interests, see supra note 25. 
 51. See, e.g., BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 121 (describing the challenges to internal gov-
ernance of a corporation where there are “owners without appreciable control and the control with-
out appreciable ownership . . . ”). 
 52. The empirical research regarding investments is often focused at the household, rather than 
the individual, level. Investment assets are often subject to joint ownership interests for assets ac-
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porations operate and the standards by which they are governed. Esti-
mates range from just under 50%54 to over 54% of American households 
are invested in the stock market.55 Not only has the number of Americans 
invested in the stock market changed the nature of stock investment but 
the circumstances under which most Americans invest have also contrib-
uted to the change.56 For example, stock ownership is increasingly indi-
rect, typically in mutual funds through an employer-sponsored plan or 
investment company, rather than purchasing shares of stock held directly 
in one company.57 Additionally, the reasons for investing have evolved 
from a voluntary, discretionary asset allocation for wealthier households 
                                                                                                             
quired during a marriage and are often intended for the support of the entire household rather than 
the individual holder. The focus on the household rather than the individual is consistent with finan-
cial and economic research. See, e.g., Jane Wheelock & Elizabeth Oughton, The Household as a 
Focus for Research, 29 J. ECON. ISSUES 143 (1996) (discussing the merits of household level re-
search on issues related to consumption and labor supply). 
 53. See infra Part III for a discussion of other investor interests, such as social and political 
interests, implicated by corporate action. 
 54. In 1989, when equity ownership in America was first calculated, 32% of American house-
holds owned stocks or bonds. INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, EQUITY AND 
BOND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2008 9 (2008), available at www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_08_equity_owners 
.pdf [hereinafter ICI & SIFMA]. As of the first quarter of 2008, 45% of households in America (ap-
proximately 54.5 million citizens) own stocks or bonds, falling from a peak of 53% in 2001. Id. 
There are four primary means by which individuals may own stock. Thirty-four million 
directly own shares in publicly traded companies. Twenty-seven million own shares in 
equity mutual funds outside of retirement saving plans and pension accounts; some of 
these individuals also own stock directly. Nearly 34 million own equity through self-
directed retirement plans such as Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans or 401(k) 
plans, and 48 million own equity through defined contribution pension plans. There is 
substantial overlap among these four methods of share ownership. When this overlap is 
accounted for, a total of 84 million shareowners hold stock through at least one of these 
channels, and three million hold stock through all four channels. 
J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 2.30 (2011). Forty-
three percent hold bond-based mutual funds and 45% hold hybrid mutual funds. Press Release, Secu-
rities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Nearly Half of U.S. Households Owns Equities, 
Bonds (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=9624. 
 55. Dennis Jacobe, In U.S., 54% Have Stock Market Investments, Lowest Since 1999, GALLUP 
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147206/Stock-Market-Investments-Lowest-1999.aspx 
(based on the responses of over 1000 adults to a telephone poll, stock ownership among American 
households, either directly or indirectly, is 54%, the lowest percentage number since Gallup began 
tracking equity ownership in 1999); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: 2012, tbl.1211, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/banking_finance_ 
insurance/stocks_and_bonds_equity_ownership.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2011) (calculating the 
percentage of American households invested in the stock market, either directly or indirectly, at 
53.3% in 2007). 
 56. See ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 23 (documenting and discussing investment 
trends in 2010). 
 57. Id. at 83; Evans, supra note 9 (describing the decline in direct ownership and trend toward 
investment through and with institutional investors like mutual funds). 
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to a nearly compulsory endeavor for employees through employer-
provided 401(k) plans as the predominant form of retirement saving.58 
Mutual funds, rather than direct stock ownership, are the fastest 
growing class of investments among individual investors.59 Recent data 
suggest that American households are selling their direct stock and in-
vesting primarily in mutual funds.60 The trend of investment in mutual 
funds as a part of retirement savings among individual investors is not 
new, but the numbers paint a more precise picture than summation alone 
in demonstrating the true scope of this trend. “In 2010, an estimated 90 
million individual investors owned mutual funds and held 87 percent of 
total mutual fund assets at year-end.”61 Total U.S. household investment 
in the stock market is 54%,62 out of which 51.6 million households, or 
44% of all U.S. households, own mutual funds.63 
To better understand this investment trend and forecast, one must 
examine how investors are entering the market. Among these mutual 
fund owners, a vast majority use mutual fund investments for retirement 
                                                 
 58. “Ownership inside tax-deferred accounts accounted for most of the increase in the 1989 to 
2001 period and has since remained steady, which implies that most of the decline since 2001 oc-
curred outside tax-deferred accounts. Tax-deferred accounts include employer-sponsored retirement 
plans and Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).” ICI & SIFMA, supra note 54, at 15; see also 
Mark Klock, What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud Buyers of 
Securities a Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disastrous Result and Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 309, 352 (2010) (“At one time, a relatively small segment of the public invested in 
publicly-traded securities. Now a significant proportion of the U.S. population owns publicly-traded 
stocks, either directly or indirectly. A major trend in the investment world has been the remarkable 
growth of stock ownership through defined-contribution retirement plans. Additionally, there has 
been even more remarkable growth in mutual funds.”); Medill, supra note 17, at 481 (discussing 
automatic enrollment as the new trend in 401(k) plan administration). 
 59. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 8–9, 80 (“As households have increased their reli-
ance on funds, their demand for directly held stocks has been decreasing for most of the dec-
ade . . . .”). 
60. Households are the largest group of investors in funds, and registered investment 
companies managed 19 percent of households’ financial assets at year-end 2008 . . . . As 
households have increased their reliance on funds, their demand for directly held stocks 
and bonds has grown more slowly. For example, over the period 2004 to 2008, house-
holds purchased, on net, a total of $2.4 trillion in mutual funds (including through varia-
ble annuities), ETFs, and closed-end funds, while they sold $2.5 trillion of directly held 
stock. Much of this shift by households toward funds has been through net purchases of 
mutual funds. 
INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE FACTBOOK 8 (49th ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.icifactbook.org/2009/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf. 
 61. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 80. 
 62. See supra note 55. 
 63. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 80. 
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savings.64 These investment trends will persist in light of the fact that 
72% of first-time mutual fund purchases after 2005 were made inside 
employer-sponsored plans,65 which is a 20% increase since 1990.66 Addi-
tionally, initial money invested in a mutual fund through employer-
sponsored retirement plans tends to stay invested in a mutual fund, even 
if the funds do not remain in the original employer-sponsored account.67 
For example, after termination, the Wal-Mart employee can maintain her 
shares in the original BlackRock funds, or she may “rollover”68 the in-
vestments into her new employer’s plan or open a self-directed Individu-
al Retirement Account (IRA).69 Throughout these transitions, whether to 
a private or to another employer-sponsored account, the investment typi-








                                                 
 64. Id. at 85–86. “The most significant distribution channel for equity mutual funds is the re-
tirement channel. Thanks to special tax treatment tremendous incentives have been created to en-
courage workers to invest their wages into mutual funds held by retirement plans.” Taub, supra note 
5, at 851. 
65. As 401(k) and other employer-sponsored DC retirement plans have become increas-
ingly popular in the workplace, the fraction of households that make their first foray into 
mutual fund investing inside their employer-sponsored retirement plans has increased. 
Among those households that made their first mutual fund purchase in 2005 or later, 72 
percent did so inside an employer-sponsored retirement plan . . . . 
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 85. 
 66. “Among those households that made their first purchase before 1990, 52 percent did so 
inside an employer-sponsored retirement plan.” Id. 
 67. “[Sixty-three] percent of mutual fund-owning households without funds in workplace ac-
counts held funds in their IRAs and in many cases, these IRAs held assets rolled over from 401(k)s 
or other employer-sponsored retirement plans (defined benefit or DC plans).” Id. at 86. 
68. These DC Plans permit investors to transfer their DC Plan assets (but not DB Plan as-
sets) into Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”). In addition to maintaining the tax re-
lief and creditor shielding available in DC Plans, [retail customers] find IRAs attractive, 
because IRAs provide greater investment options, often at less cost, than DC Plans. A re-
cent study indicated that as a result of rollovers from DC Plans into IRAs (often due to 
job changes or losses), investors had more assets in IRAs, which are not subject to 
ERISA fiduciary standards, than they held in 401(k)s, which are subject to ERISA fiduci-
ary standards. 
David Groshoff, Responding to Dodd−Frank Section 913’s Punt: An Essay Calling for Bifurcated 
Fiduciary Standards Among Retail Financial Advice Providers, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 151, 
159 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 69. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 86. 
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Table 1: American Investment by the Numbers 
 
54% of American Households Invest in the stock market 
44% of American Households Invest in mutual funds 
68% of American Households 
invested in mutual funds 
Own mutual funds in employer-
sponsored plans 
72% of American Households
First purchased securities through an 
employer-sponsored fund if entering 
the market in 2005 or later 
 
C. Recognizing a New Reality: The Emergence of the Citizen 
Shareholder as the Dominant Shareholder Identity 
 
Rising investments in mutual funds—a trend predicted long ago70—
and the declining dominance of individual investment in direct compa-
nies, coupled with the decline of private71 pensions,72 fundamentally alter 
the shareholder identity and investment assumptions. The proliferation of 
mutual fund ownership as facilitated by employer-sponsored defined 
contribution retirement plans is likely to continue, especially in light of 
developments such as automatic enrollment in employer-sponsored con-
tribution plans. Automatic enrollment makes 401(k) plan participation 
the default option for employees, which both encourages greater employ-
                                                 
 70. See, e.g., MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FUNDS: AN INSIDER’S VIEW 14–18 (2d 
ed. 2011). 
 71. Note that government-sponsored pension plans, particularly at the state and local level, 
remain a meaningful mechanism for public-sector employees to save for retirement. See supra dis-
cussion Part II.B. The issues raised in this Article, in part, apply to public employees participating in 
pensions because the pensions are invested in the market similar to mutual funds. 
 72. Id. at 283; cf. Stevens, ICI Speech, supra note 17. The term pension has broad meaning and 
can include any form of employer-sponsored retirement program, including both defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans. In this Article, I distinguish between defined contribution plans, which 
include employee-directed accounts such as IRAs, 401(k)s, and 457s. The term pension is used 
above to focus only on defined benefit plans. See, e.g., Jeff Schwartz, supra note 19, at 55 (“The 
traditional private pension is the defined benefit plan. In these plans, employers promise to provide 
their employees with a portion of their preretirement income in retirement. Such plans, however, are 
on the decline and now cover only a small portion of the population.”); DIANA FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, 
HUDSON INST., UNION VS. PRIVATE PENSION PLANS: HOW SECURE ARE UNION MEMBERS’ 
RETIREMENT 6 (2008), available at http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/UnionVsPrivatePen 
sionPlans.pdf. 
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ee participation in retirement savings and likens such private investment 
to a form of employment tax.73 Given the current number of mutual fund 
investors and the emergence of automatic enrollment, the number of citi-
zen shareholders has achieved a critical mass that will continue to ex-
pand. The emerging dominance of the citizen shareholder requires meas-
uring corporate success in terms that protect these investors’ interests. 
One change resulting from the growth of mutual fund investment is 
that mutual fund ownership is different in nature from direct stock own-
ership.74 A mutual fund investor is not an owner in the underlying com-
pany and thus is excluded from exercising shareholder rights or having 
her interests represented in the agency paradigm.75 Mutual fund manag-
ers, not the investors, exercise direct shareholder rights such as voting, 
and the limitations of this representation is discussed below in section D. 
An investor entering through employer-sponsored defined contribution 
plans like a 401(k) “takes the economic risk, but . . . she is not the legal 
owner of the mutual fund or the underlying portfolio companies. In this 
way . . . she is distanced even more from the location of control over the 
capital . . . she has at risk.”76 
                                                 
 73. I hope to explore these ideas and the comparisons in future works. My initial thoughts are 
that tax incentives to invest, general investor information asymmetries, and automatic enrollment, as 
well as other structural constraints, make participating in an employer-sponsored contribution plan 
closer to the nature of an employment tax or a condition of employment. The consequences of en-
couraging participation are good: individual retirement savings. Savings benefit the individual inves-
tor as well as society by lessening the need for familial or governmental assistance after retirement. I 
do not question the positive result of the program. But to the extent that individual investors are 
pushed into private markets to serve, at least in part, a public function, the system into which the 
individual invests should be subject to rigorous safeguards and scrutiny. 
 74. The voting rights are different, the reporting rights are different, and the exit remedies are 
also significantly altered. Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 88–89 (“Mutual funds differ from 
ordinary companies in all three categories of shareholder rights, but they are most unusual in terms 
of exit.”). 
Corporations have an additional and significantly different set of problems: they are le-
gally required to represent not a group of people but a legally defined set of interests—
the interests of a fictional creature called a shareholder that has no associations, economic 
incentives or political views other than a desire to profit from its connection with this par-
ticular corporation. 
Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 
995, 1033 (1998). 
 75. “Mutual funds are financial intermediaries through which investors pool their money for 
collective investment, usually in marketable securities.” Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 580; see also 
ROBERT C. POZEN, THE MUTUAL FUND BUSINESS 4 (1998). 
 76. Taub, supra note 5, at 851. 
[Investors] “purchase” shares through their defined contribution (DC) plan that is spon-
sored by their employer. This is often referred to as the retirement channel. In the retire-
ment channel, though, the retirement plan is the legal owner of fund shares. The employ-
ee is considered a “plan participant” and merely directs the plan to make investments of 
his or her pre-tax wages in accordance with his or her instructions. 
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Investing in mutual funds not only alters the nature of what is 
“owned” but also alters the level of risk exposure77 because of diversifi-
cation.78 For example, when an investor buys one share of a mutual fund, 
she holds an indirect interest in all of the stocks, bonds, or other securi-
ties invested in by the mutual fund in accordance with the mutual fund’s 
investment objectives.79 Because one share represents an ownership in-
terest in many securities, investors achieve a certain level of investment 
diversification80 with just one investment decision. Diversification, in 
theory, reduces a specific firm’s ability to affect the bottom line of the 
investor’s retirement savings.81 
Because a mutual fund owner is invested in “the market” or a repre-
sentative sample of the whole,82 she may care more about overall growth 
and stability of the market rather than the performance of a specific 
firm.83 Additionally, she may incorporate a broader view of risk analysis 
that takes into account stakeholder interests84 in addition to traditional 
economic interests.85 
                                                                                                             
Id. 
77. A single shareholder, or multiple shareholders with homogeneous preferences, would 
in theory be able to specify a single objective for running the firm. Shareholders with pri-
vate interests, however, might prefer the firm to pursue those interests at the expense of 
the interests they have in common with other shareholders . . . . Thus, when shareholders 
have divergent private interests, it is no longer accurate to think of shareholder action as a 
collective good . . . . Put another way, how a shareholder would like the firm to be man-
aged becomes a function of who the shareholder is and what its private interests are. 
Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 575. 
 78. Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 564; Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Share-
holder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 84 (2008); Stout, supra note 5, at 1448–49. 
 79. Taub, supra note 5, at 848–49. 
 80. “A universal shareholder is, in effect, a highly diversified investor. She invests . . . in the 
equities of many different firms in many different industries.” Stout, supra note 5, at 1448; see also 
Taub, supra note 5, at 852. 
 81. See, e.g., Diversifying Your Portfolio, INVESTORGUIDE.COM, http://www.investorguide 
.com/igu-article-543-asset-allocation-diversifying-your-portfolio.html (describing the benefits of 
individual portfolio diversification) (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 82. This occurs through investment vehicles like index funds. The ICI 2011 Factbook defines 
index funds as “[a] fund designed to track the performance of a market index. The fund’s portfolio of 
securities is either a replicate or a representative sample of the designated market index.” ICI 2011 
FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 218. 
 83. Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (Or How Investor Diversi-
fication Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 429 (1998) (asserting that diversified share-
holders do not care about firm-specific risk or longevity). 
 84. “[A]ttention to traditional ‘stakeholder’ interests such as the effect of corporate operations 
on the environment, employees, or local communities, is seen as a means of generating long-term 
shareholder weather and improving portfolio- and firm-level risk assessment.” Ho, supra note 8, at 
62 (defining the role of stakeholders in the enlightened shareholder value approach advanced in the 
article); see also Taub, supra note 5, at 860 (“Included within a list of such stakeholders might be 
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Differences in ownership between direct and indirect stockholders, 
as well as the diversification of indirect stockholders, may affect an in-
vestor’s preference for corporate externalities86 as well as other factors 
that influence portfolio analysis.87 Externalities are costs generated but 
not borne by the corporation. While mutual fund investors should88 pre-
fer market performance as a whole over firm-specific returns as a result 
of diversification, they should also be concerned about corporate practic-
es that generate externalities that affect other industries or the securities 
market as a whole.89 
Because questions of risk and return are not company-specific for 
mutual fund investors,90 some academics have described these share-
                                                                                                             
employees, suppliers, customers, the local community, the environment, future generations, and 
perhaps anyone impacted significantly by externalities resulting from corporate operations.”). 
85. In other words, like many economic theories, the principal−agent model assumes in-
vestors only care about making money. Most people, and certainly most investors, do 
want to acquire money. Extensive empirical evidence demonstrates, however (as does 
casual observation) that money is not the only thing people care about. People often act 
as if they care about other things as well, including their friends and loved ones; their 
community; the environment; social justice, and the welfare of humanity. 
Stout, supra note 5, at 1449. 
 86. See, e.g., Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott, Jr., Externalities and Corporate Objectives in 
a World with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 42 (1996) 
(arguing that diversified shareholders do not want corporations to produce externalities in pursuit of 
profit maximization, but instead want companies to pursue policies that are portfolio maximizing 
thus minimizing externalities); see also Fairfax, supra note 78, at 84. 
 87. In the literature, this distinction is often referred to as the division between the diversified 
and the undiversified shareholder. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 584–85. 
88. It simply doesn’t make economic sense for [universal owners] to put much time or ef-
fort into finding out what’s going on at any of the particular companies in which they 
hold shares. Instead, they focus their attention on information that is simple, easy, and 
cheap to obtain: stock price. As a result they usually don’t know when a company is ex-
ternalizing costs onto their other interests . . . . They assume a rising share price must 
translate into a personal benefit, ignorant of the damage being done to other parts of their 
universal portfolio. 
LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS 
INVESTORS, CORPORATION, AND THE PUBLIC 89–90 (2012). 
89. The extent of a shareholder’s diversification also matters with respect to how that 
shareholder regards externalities, or spillover effects, that firms generate. One conse-
quence of “owning the economy” is that, unlike less well-diversified investors, universal 
owners can be expected to feel the impact of actions by one company in their portfolio on 
their other portfolio companies. In other words, through its extensive holdings, the uni-
versal shareholder internalizes many of the externalities generated by the companies in 
which it invests. Universal owners are thus likely to favor activities of firms in which 
they own shares that minimize negative externalities (and maximize positive ones) to the 
extent that those activities impose costs on (or can be captured by) other firms in which 
they own an interest. 
Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 585. 
 90. This fact applies to all types of diversified investors, including mutual fund owners. See, 
e.g., ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 216 (Diversification is “[t]he practice of investing 
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holders as “universal investors.”91 The phrase universal investor de-
scribes what an investor owns and her interest in the performance of the 
market as a whole, as compared to an interest in a specific company.92 
The theory of universal investors also describes the reduction in firm-
specific risks achieved through portfolio diversification, as well as an 
increased vulnerability to systemic risks or failures within the market.93 
The economic realities of modern investment diminish the relevance of 
the traditional shareholder identity. Understanding that market perfor-
mance, rather than company-specific performance, has the greatest im-
pact on the portfolio of a growing majority of investors underscores the 
need to recast the agency paradigm with the universal interest of the citi-
zen shareholder.94  
Incorporating a “general” identity of the shareholder in the agency 
paradigm lessens the need to find a way around shareholder heterogenei-
ty,95 which is discussed in the corporate law literature. If (a) stock in-
vestment is a common practice, and for a majority of those investors, 
they (b) invest in securities that advance a universal investor approach, 
then focusing on investor-specific interests is incomplete. The current 
economic reality of how a majority of individuals invest suggests that 
while there are vast individual differences in investment performance 
                                                                                                             
broadly across a number of different securities, industries, or asset classes to reduce risk. Diversifi-
cation is a key benefit of investing in mutual funds and other investment companies that have diver-
sified portfolios.”). 
 91. HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note, at 28; see also Fairfax, supra note 78, at 83–85. 
 92. HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note, at 28; see also Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 584–85; cf. 
Fairfax, supra note 78, at 84 n.170 (“[U]ndiversified shareholders tend to have large stakes in a 
given company. This increases the likelihood that they are long-term investors. Hence, it is likely 
that such shareholders care deeply about their own firm’s employees, customers, and creditors be-
cause their investment is linked with the well-being of these other stakeholder groups. In this regard, 
it is probably more accurate to state that diversified shareholders are concerned about a broader 
range of stakeholders.”). 
 93. The opposite is true for individuals invested directly in one company or who have a large 
holding in a particular company so that their portfolio is disproportionately tied to the returns of one 
company. In that instance, the externalization of risk is preferred to the internalization. 
 94. Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 584–85. 
 95. This section does not suggest that the different investor interests do not matter; instead, 
what this section suggests is that for this class of investors—mutual fund investors who enter the 
market through employer-sponsored retirement accounts—their economic interests can be general-
ized into a preference for market performance given the circumstances under which and purposes for 
which they invest. For a discussion of the appropriate role of shareholder interest diversity in corpo-
rate governance, see generally STOUT, supra note 88 (providing examples of shareholder heterogene-
ity, including long-term versus short-term investors, direct investors versus mutual fund investors, 
individual versus institutional investors, as well as interests in social and political consequences of 
corporate action). 
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and policy, those economic differences matter little to citizen sharehold-
ers when there is an undeniable common interest in the overall perfor-
mance of the market.96 Even if market performance as a whole is not a 
recognized interest for each individual investor, it is a valid measure or 
substitute for mutual fund investors as a class within the agency para-
digm. Replacing the focus on individual, direct shareholders with the 
image of the citizen shareholder captures the vast mass of investors who 
enter the market through employer-sponsored plans for individual re-
tirement savings. Adopting a generalized shareholder standard, like that 
of the citizen shareholder, diminishes the import of individual economic 
differences as between investors and modernizes the agency paradigm by 
holding corporate managers accountable to the interests of mutual fund 
investors and, consequently, market stability and performance as a 
whole. 
A shift in thinking away from company-specific performance and 
from investor-specific identities would discourage policies that generate 
externalities such as excessive risk taking and unsustainable environmen-
tal, employee, and social policies.97 Recent examples of such risk taking 
and externalities are evident in the failures of companies like Lehman 
Brothers, the damage to financial institutions involved in the creation and 
sale of collateralized debt instruments, and the resulting weakened hous-
ing market.98 Supplementing the agency paradigm with the citizen share-
holder, and thus a focus on market performance, encourages market-
stabilizing practices. Specifically, it reduces incentives for a company to 
engage in practices that generate spillover effects or externalities that 
have consequences outside of a specific firm and affect the market as a 
whole.99 
                                                 
 96. Corporate law should have different standards that account for different shareholder inter-
ests. I do not suggest otherwise; rather, I suggest that for mutual fund investors, the standard is mar-
ket performance as a whole rather than firm-specific performance. There is also an implicit bias 
toward long-term investment strategies when weighing the interests of this class of investors. 
 97. See, e.g., Hansen & Lott, supra note 86, at 44–46. 
 98. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, The Crisis Without a Face: Emerging Narratives in the Finan-
cial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 999, 1009–10; see also Ho, supra note 8, at 89 (“The global eco-
nomic crisis has also moved public opinion and public policy further in the direction of enlightened 
shareholder value by calling attention to the dangers of short-term investment strategies and encour-
aging a reassessment of the balance between risk taking and risk management.”). 
99. Universal investors have to worry about a problem that undiversified shareholders 
don’t need to worry about—the possibility that, in the ruthless pursuit of a higher share 
price, the board of directors of one company may adopt business strategies that have neg-
ative “spillover” effects on the universal investor’s other assets. Such negative spillover 
effects are not only possible, but common, in today’s business world. 
Stout, supra note 5, at 1448. 
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The evolving nature of corporate investment—the widespread par-
ticipation, the rise in indirect ownership, the limited choices offered in 
the context of employer-sponsored plans—creates a new reality that must 
be acknowledged and incorporated into the governance standards of cor-
porate law. Supplementing the image of the single shareholder and its 
corresponding idiosyncratic set of needs and interests100 with that of the 
citizen shareholder infuses the agency paradigm with the tools to incor-
porate indirect owners’ interests—economic, social, political—
previously excluded from consideration and determine how they affect 
overall market performance. 
D. Dilution of Citizen Shareholder Rights Under the 
Traditional Agency Paradigm 
The evolving nature of corporate stock ownership by individuals 
highlights the need to align corporate managers’ actions with investors’ 
interests. Corporate governance rules affect more citizens as stock own-
ership by American households has climbed above 50% and continues to 
increase.101 Thus, the shareholder status is an important feature of the 
citizen status. Occupying the majority status, stock ownership thus justi-
fies the dedication of significant resources102 to ensure the health and 
integrity of the system; there is great incentive to get it right and more at 
stake if we do not. Consequently, the theoretical models relied on by 
corporate law should evolve along with the circumstances under which 
the greatest number of citizens invest. 
                                                 
100. A single shareholder, or multiple shareholders with homogeneous preferences, 
would in theory be able to specify a single objective for running the firm. Shareholders 
with private interests, however, might prefer the firm to pursue those interests at the ex-
pense of the interests they have in common with other shareholders . . . . Thus, when 
shareholders have divergent private interests, it is no longer accurate to think of share-
holder action as a collective good . . . . Put another way, how a shareholder would like the 
firm to be managed becomes a function of who the shareholder is and what its private in-
terests are. 
Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 575. 
 101. See generally ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13; Stevens, ICI Speech, supra note 17. 
 102. By resources I mean thought, scholarly debate, public scrutiny, and possibly resulting 
changes in legislation and subsequent enforcement through the legal system. What those specific 
changes would be will be the subject of future works. My intent with this Article is to articulate the 
tensions between the theory and the reality of modern investments, identify where the two are incon-
gruent, and begin thinking about how to better infuse the theory with the economic reality of invest-
ments for a majority of investors. 
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Traditional shareholder rights intended to alleviate the agency prob-
lem—usually focused on voting, disclosure, and exit rights103—are dis-
torted in the context of indirect ownership facilitated through employer-
sponsored funds. This distortion occurs because the mutual fund is an 
intermediary104 that is inserted into the traditional paradigm to create 
three actors: shareholders in the mutual fund, the mutual fund as the di-
rect shareholder in the corporation,105 and management of the corpora-
tion. Inserting an intermediary increases the distance between the ulti-
mate owners (the mutual fund investors) and those in control (corporate 
management)106 and leaves indirect investors without a direct voice in 
corporate governance or represented interests in the traditional agency 
paradigm.107 That increased distance also weakens the accountability 
mechanisms provided to shareholders under traditional corporate law so 
that symptoms of modern corporate investment, such as rational share-
holder passivity and diluted shareholder voice,108 are magnified with in-
direct ownership.109 
Indirect ownership distorts traditional shareholder rights—voice 
through vote, choice in investment, information rights, and exit remedies. 
In regards to choice, when an individual invests in securities through an 
employer-sponsored plan, the decision to invest is strongly encouraged 
by tax incentives and, with features like automatic enrollment, is not a 
                                                 
 103. “Since the publication of a widely read book by Albert Hirschman in 1970, social scien-
tists have come to agree that all organizations give to their members and owners some combination 
of the same three basic kinds of rights: exit, voice, and liability.” Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 
87. 
 104. “Mutual funds are financial intermediaries through which investors pool their money for 
collective investment, usually in marketable securities.” Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 580; see also 
POZEN, supra note 75, at 3. 
 105. A mutual fund that invests in stock is considered the shareholder in the underlying corpo-
ration; the mutual fund exercises corporate governance rights. See, e.g., Taub, supra note 5, at 848. 
 106. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 37, at 143 (“[Investment intermediaries] exacerbated 
the separation of ownership and control, extending the distance between managers and the individu-
als who were the ultimate beneficial owners.”). 
 107. For a discussion on the limitations of mutual fund advisors to represent the interests of 
those invested in the funds, see generally, Taub, supra note 5, at 852–55, 867–70, 892–93. 
 108. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Fiduciary Relationships for Socially Responsible In-
vesting: A Multinational Perspective, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 597, 603 (2011) (discussing the common-
place of shareholder passivity and its role in both theoretical and practical debates). 
 109. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 523 (1990); 
see also Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 88–89; Michael C. Schouten, Why Governance Might 
Work in Mutual Funds, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 86 (2011) (“Shareholder activism 
in mutual funds nevertheless remains uncommon, which is widely attributed to collective action 
problems. Because shareholders in mutual funds are typically household investors, their stakes are 
said to be too small to make activism worthwhile.”). 
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voluntary transaction in the traditional sense of the phrase.110 Second, the 
employer determines the participating funds and offers a fixed list of in-
vestment options, not the full panoply of securities available on the mar-
ket. Third, mutual fund products are the predominant asset class offered 
in such plans.111 For example, IBM offers nineteen funds in its 401(k) 
PLUS Plan.112 Of these nineteen funds, eleven are mutual funds (eight 
U.S.-based equities and three foreign equity funds), four are bond funds, 
two are real estate REITS, and one is a money market fund.113 These 
structural conditions facilitate citizens investing in the market, most in 
the form of mutual funds, and most entering the market through employ-
er-sponsored funds. 
The following example demonstrates the distorting affect of indi-
rect ownership on traditional shareholder rights intended to strike the 
appropriate power balance between shareholders and managers in the 
agency paradigm. Investor A is a direct investor in IBM, and Investor B 
is a mutual fund investor invested in BlackRock mutual funds through 
her employer’s (Wal-Mart’s) plan. BlackRock mutual fund invests in 
IBM, along with other funds. Annually, Investor A can vote to elect the 
board of directors of IBM114 and recommend certain corporate policies 
through the proxy process.115 Investor A receives proxy statements from 
IBM before the annual director elections and votes on other matters of 
                                                 
 110. The system is set up so that the default is to invest, and it takes positive action on behalf 
of the employee to avoid that result. It is not voluntary in the traditional sense of the word because it 
is not a transaction that was independently sought out by the individual and completed in the absence 
of encouragement or inducement to do so. See, e.g., Medill, supra note 17, at 481 (noting that auto-
matic enrollment plans were “a new and growing trend in the world of 401(k) plans”). 
In 2010, Hewitt Associates reported that 58% of mid- to large-sized companies were using auto-
matic enrollment 401(k) plans. Christine Dugas, Efforts to Raise 401(K) Participation Hit Snag, 
USA TODAY, Jan. 10, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/retirement/2010-01-10-401k-re 
tirement-fix_N.htm. 
The rise of the automatic enrollment 401(k) plans began in 1998 when the IRS “issued a series of 
revenue rulings that encourage employers who sponsor 401(k) plans to enroll all eligible workers in 
the plan, deduct a set percentage of employee compensation (typically one to three percent), and 
contribute that amount to employee 401(k) plans.” Medill, supra note 17, at 515. 
 111. Mutual funds or index funds of U.S. and international securities make up a majority of 
plan investment options and are supplemented by bond funds and low-interest earning money market 
accounts. See, e.g., infra notes 143−44. 
 112. International Business Machines (IBM) 401k Plus Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.myplan 
iq.com/LTISystem/f401k_view.action?ID=675# (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
 113. Id. 
 114. “To be sure, shareholders in the American public corporation have the right to vote on the 
election of directors.” Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 837. 
 115. Id. at 846–47 (describing end-of-game decisions that the board can bring to the sharehold-
er for an approval/veto vote). 
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corporate significance such as proposed mergers.116 If Investor A be-
comes dissatisfied with the returns generated, concerned by the social 
practices, or conflicted with the political positions of IBM, Investor A 
may sell her shares on the secondary market through vehicles like E-
Trade or another broker and reinvest in another company of her 
choice.117 
Compare this to the rights of Investor B, who also has investments 
in IBM through her mutual fund shares in BlackRock. Investor B has no 
right to vote in IBM elections, although she may exercise voting rights in 
the BlackRock mutual funds. Only BlackRock can vote in IBM elections. 
Additionally, Investor B has no right to receive information directly from 
IBM and thus has diluted information rights. Investor B also has signifi-
cant barriers to removing her investment due to diluted information 
rights. And her alternative investment options are constrained by the oth-
er funds included in Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan.118 These distinctions are 
further discussed below. 
For a majority of investors, their voting rights are limited to matters 
affecting the intermediary mutual fund119 but not the final destination of 
the investment, the individual company. This limit means that an indi-
vidual invested in a mutual fund with 100 companies in the fund’s profile 
would have money in the 100 individual companies but no voting rights 
associated with that “investment.” Thus, the scope of the voting rights 
for mutual fund investors is reduced along with the power of such votes. 
In practice, mutual fund investors bear the risks of ownership without the 
protection of rights typically associated with ownership.120 As demon-
strated in the example above, Investor A can participate in the corporate 
democracy of IBM, but Investor B cannot.121 These diminished rights 
could be viewed as the cost of the convenience offered by mutual 
                                                 
 116. See Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1 to 14b-2 (1990); 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1990); see also Black, supra note 109, at 536–41 (describing shareholder 
notice and voting rules); MARK SARGENT & DENNIS HONABACH, PROXY RULES HANDBOOK, § 2:12 
(2011) (describing proxy voting rules). 
 117. See, e.g., Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 89. 
 118. See, e.g., infra notes 175–77 (describing the fund options within the 401(k) plans offered 
by the three case study companies: Wal-Mart, IBM, and WellPoint). 
 119. See, e.g., Daniel S. Alterbaum, To “Make Full Disclosure and Play No Tricks”: A Pro-
posal to Enhance Fee Transparency After Jones v. Harris Associates, 120 YALE L.J. 1579, 1581–82 
(discussing an investor’s right to vote on mutual fund matters as guaranteed through the Investment 
Company Act of 1940). 
 120. Taub, supra note 5, at 851. 
 121. The mutual fund invested in IBM can, however, participate in IBM’s corporate democra-
cy. Id. at 848. “The intermediaries who stand between investors and corporate managers have their 
own interests, which are often at odds with the investors who trust them, and at times aligned with 
corporate management.” Id. at 847. 
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funds—the price paid to have a third party manage individual investment 
portfolios.122 
   Mutual fund managers, and other institutional investors, repre-
sent indirect shareholders’ interests and should be good stewards because 
they have better access to financial and company information,123 greater 
incentive than retail investors to participate in corporate democracy,124 
and a powerful “voice” in voting due to the size of their holdings.125 Mu-
tual fund managers, however, have a history of passivity, routinely vot-
ing with management.126 Current trends suggest that mutual fund manag-
ers often delegate voting decisions to professional proxy voting services 
like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS),127 but the data are inconclu-
sive as to whether or not mutual funds have truly embraced shareholder 
activism.128 
                                                 
122. [F]or indirect shareholders who hold fund shares through a retirement plan, benefits 
include the ability to invest a relatively small amount of money and yet have access to the 
expertise of professional money managers. Individual shareholders also benefit from 
achieving a diverse portfolio of securities that would otherwise be difficult to hold effi-
ciently given the small amount of dollars invested. 
Id. at 852; see also Booth, supra note 83, at 444 (“It is so cheap and easy for investors to diversify 
that it is simply unnecessary for investors to take company-specific risk.”); Fisch, supra note 43, at 
880 (“By investing their money through an intermediary, investors delegate to that intermediary 
complete authority over investment decisions subject only to the specified terms of the investment 
vehicle.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1785–
86 (2011) (“In any event, the vast majority of shareholder-voters are institutional investors. These 
entities do not need shorthand to sort through information that may be expensive, or otherwise diffi-
cult, to procure. Rather, these institutions have the resource, the ability, and the duty to stay apprised 
of the content of shareholder proposals.”). 
 124. Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Govern-
ance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 309, 323 (2011). 
 125. Id.; James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and Mutual 
Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (“Mutual funds represent the largest 
shareholder voting bloc in U.S. corporate governance . . . .”). 
 126. Palmiter, supra note 30, at 1430–31 (summarizing the history of mutual fund voting prior 
to 1970, as well as academic studies concluding that mutual funds are passive investors). 
127. We find that mutual funds tend to vote in line with ISS recommendations across the 
board. First, mutual funds vote consistently with ISS recommendations more often than 
do all shareholders. Second, mutual funds vote consistently with ISS recommendations 
more often than with management recommendations, both on non-routine management 
proposals and shareholder proposals, and on specific types of anti-takeover and corporate 
governance proposals. 
Cotter, Palmiter & Thomas, supra note 122, at 2. 
 128. Compare id., with JACKIE COOK & BETH YOUNG, THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, FUND 
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While mutual fund investors are represented by mutual fund man-
agers who vote on behalf of the fund and its investors, academics debate 
the efficacy of such representation.129 The primary concerns regarding 
mutual fund representation of investors’ interests include the following: 
the conflict of interest between the mutual fund managers’ desire to align 
interests with the fund sponsor (the employer or plan distributor) rather 
than the fund participants (the employees);130 the interests of mutual fund 
managers are inherently conflicted with those of their investors because 
of how they are compensated and their performance evaluated;131 the 
free-rider problem where mutual funds are asked to bear the costs of ac-
tivism without securing the sole benefit;132 and both fund sponsors and 
participants choose funds based on recent returns.133 When there are 
                                                                                                             
an independent study conducted in 2006, the Corporate Library concluded that major mutual fund 
families vote in favor of management resolutions over shareholder proposals. Id. 
 129. See supra note 25. 
 130. “[T]he [mutual fund] industry’s true customers are not individual investors, but rather 
portfolio companies that can decide how to allocate their employee-thrift business.” Cotter, Palmiter 
& Thomas, supra note 122, at 15. 
 131. Palmiter, supra note 30, at 1432; Taub, supra note 5, at 845, 867–75 (describing the con-
flicts of interests between mutual fund managers and investors). 
[P]ersonal managerial motivations to some degree influenced by a firm’s culture explain 
the desire to meet earnings targets. Managers may lose their jobs, fail to be promoted, or 
find their opportunities to move to other firms impeded by their failure to meet earnings 
targets. In addition, managers may suffer a decrease in compensation. To increase their 
compensation, managers may seek short-term performance to enhance their bonuses 
(based on accounting-earnings performance), stock compensation (based on stock-price 
performance), or compensation based on the amount of assets under management that is 
enhanced by short-term profits that draw additional assets to their funds. 
Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 
265, 272 (2012); see also ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE 
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/overcome_ short_state0909_0.pdf 
(discussing the concerns regarding the “influence of money managers, mutual funds and hedge 
funds—and those intermediaries who provide them capital—who focus on short-term stock price 
performance, and/or favor high-leverage and high-risk corporate strategies designed to produce high 
short-term returns . . . .”). 
 132. Roberta Romano, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance in the US, in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE US AND EUROPE: WHERE ARE WE NOW? 55 (Geoffrey Owen et 
al. eds., 2006); see also Dallas, supra note 128, at 270 (asserting that “shareholders prefer short-term 
results and focus on short-term information”). 
 133. Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Performance Advertising: Inherently 
and Materially Misleading?, 46 GA. L. REV. 289, 297 (“Studies have found that [historical high 
returns] might be the most important factor for the typical investor choosing among funds.”); see 
also Noel Capon et al., An Individual Level Analysis of the Mutual Fund Investment Decision, 10 J. 
FIN. SERVS. RES. 59, 66 (1996); INV. CO. INST., UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES FOR 
MUTUAL FUND INFORMATION 3 (2006), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_06_inv_prefs_full 
.pdf. Mutual fund managers have also been criticized for short-term investment horizons as evi-
denced by the turnover rates of mutual fund investments. See, e.g., CHRISTINE BENZ ET AL., 
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compelling criticisms regarding the efficacy of mutual fund representa-
tion of indirect owners’ interests the citizen shareholder argument should 
not be dismissed on the grounds that indirect owners’ interests are al-
ready represented in the agency paradigm.  
Perhaps the most compelling view of a mutual fund investor’s di-
minished rights, however, is exit rights. While others have argued that 
the fungible nature of mutual funds makes it an even more liquid asset 
than investment in an individual company and therefore contains 
strengthened exit rights, this view does not take into account the realities 
of how a majority of investors enter and remain in the market.134 The 
defined environment in which many Americans invest erodes the 
strength of the popular remedy of voting with dollars or feet.135 The idea 
behind exit remedies, or voting with your feet,136 is that dissatisfied 
shareholders can express their disapproval by selling their investment on 
the open market and investing elsewhere. 
Investments through employer-sponsored plans thwart traditional 
exit remedies in two respects. First, the increased distance between mu-
tual fund investors and the companies held by the fund decreases share-
holder involvement in and awareness of the underlying companies’ ac-
tions.137 As to the first concern, effective exit remedies require a mini-
mum level of corporate and mutual fund information provided to the in-
vestor. A direct owner receives information straight from the company, 
but a mutual fund investor has no such right to receive information from 
the companies in which her fund invests. Returning to the original exam-
ple, Investor B has no right to receive information directly from Compa-
                                                                                                             
MORNINGSTAR GUIDE TO MUTUAL FUNDS 11 (2004) (reporting a 114% average annual turnover in 
stock mutual fund portfolios). 
 134. See, e.g., Morley & Curtis, supra note 20, at 88–89 (asserting that investors in mutual 
funds have greater exit rights as compared to direct investors because the assets remain with the 
company being exited by direct investors, whereas a mutual fund’s assets are the investor’s cash, and 
exit from a mutual fund removes the fund’s assets and therefore poses a greater threat). 
 135. The contained choice for investors among mutual funds participating in their employer’s 
plan alters the exit remedy in that they may not have the option of an alternative mutual fund that 
offers the same diversification and investment strategy, see infra note 142, or a fund that is also not 
invested in the offending company. 
 136. Voting with feet is an expression used to describe the exit remedy of withdrawing shares 
from one investment when dissatisfied and investing elsewhere. See, e.g., Taub, supra note 5, at 878 
(“The most common defense given by passive institutional investors, including Advisers, for not 
actively participating in corporate governance reform efforts is that they “vote with their feet” or sell 
their shares if they do not like what management is doing.”). 
 137. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 32 (“Index funds continued to remain popular with 
investors. Of households that owned mutual funds, 31 percent owned at least one index mutual fund 
in 2010. As of year-end 2010, 365 index funds managed total net assets of $1 trillion.”). 
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ny X whereas Investor A, as a direct owner, would.138 Investor B can 
access other sources of information such as publicly available infor-
mation on the internet and disclosures made by the mutual fund directly 
to Investor B.139 Investor B, however, faces an onerous responsibility if 
she is tasked with both monitoring and aggregating information about all 
of the companies in which her fund invests. Additionally, the current pol-
icy and corporate law debate over reporting obligations and shareholder 
voting rights for corporate political expenditures demonstrates that a base 
level of reporting does not exist for direct or indirect shareholders with 
respect to the full range of issues that may prompt exit by the investor.140 
Second, there are structural constraints to exit for a mutual fund in-
vestor who must balance dissatisfaction with one fund company as com-
pared to the performance of the other fund companies, as well as to alter-
native investment options before making an exit choice. Even if Investor 
B through her information-gathering efforts became dissatisfied with a 
particular company that is one of 100 within her fund, she must choose 
between the risks and downsides of that one company as compared to the 
benefits of the other ninety-nine. Additionally, just as employer-
sponsored plans constrain an investor’s initial choice of funds,141 they 
also restrict the investor’s ability to choose to exit by limiting the pool of 
                                                 
 138. See supra notes 105−07 and accompanying text. 
 139. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading (Reg. FD), SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7881.htm; 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249 
(2000). “[E]lectronic media increases market efficiency by allowing dissemination of market infor-
mation in a more cost efficient, widespread, and equitable manner than traditional paper based meth-
ods.” Jack A. Rosenbloom, Direct Public Offerings on the Internet: A Viable Means of Obtaining 
Capital?, 2000 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 85, 93; see also Use of Electronic Media for Delivery 
Purposes, 60 Fed. Reg. 53458 (Oct. 13, 1995) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 231, 241, 271); Disclosure 
of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Compa-
nies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 25922, 2003 WL 215451, at *2 (Jan. 31, 2003); see also Taub, supra note 5, at 865–66 
(discussing mutual fund proxy voting reporting requirements). 
 140. See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Corporate Political Spending and Shareholders’ Rights: 
Why the U.S. Should Adopt the British Approach, in RISK MANAGEMENT AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 391, 394 (Abol Jalilvand & A.G. Malliaris eds., 2011). 
 141. An employee participating in an employer-sponsored plan with automatic enrollment may 
opt-out of the participating funds and self-manage. To do so, however, requires the investor to take 
positive action and thereafter assume a much greater role in managing his or her retirement account. 
Medill, supra note 17, at 481; see also Stevens, ICI Speech, supra note 17. The anecdotal evi-
dence—which I suspect comports with the experience of the majority of readers—as well as the 
research supports the conclusion that few employees choose to do so. Id. (“In Vanguard’s experi-
ence, auto-enrollment plans have participation rates of 82 percent of workers. That’s significantly 
higher than similar plans with voluntary enrollment.”). The tax incentives for employees to contrib-
ute a portion of their earnings before tax is also inducement to participate. Id. This inducement 
serves a positive social goal of encouraging retirement savings, but how and why investors enter the 
market should be understood and taken into account when evaluating investors’ rights. 
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alternative plans. If there are twenty funds participating in her employ-
er’s plan, Investor B’s exit choice is influenced by the attractiveness (or 
lack thereof) of the other nineteen options. Additionally, if the company, 
like IBM, is a large company traded on a U.S. exchange, it may be diffi-
cult for Investor B to find a suitable alternative mutual fund offering a 
similar risk and diversification portfolio142 that does not also invest in 
IBM.143 Investor B may be structurally constrained from exercising even 
her weakened exit rights under the terms of modern, indirect investment. 
In sum, the predominant form of investment in this country, mutual 
funds, distorts the traditional shareholder rights—voting, disclosures, and 
exit. The identity of the shareholder in the agency paradigm is outdated 
and relies on the image of the direct shareholder, which is not the eco-
nomic reality for a majority of investors. As a result, the agency para-
digm excludes the interests of indirect investors from its inquiry into 
shareholder interests. Finally, even though they are granted as a means to 
achieve the appropriate power balance between shareholders and manag-
ers, basic shareholder rights lose significant value in the context of mod-
ern, indirect investment. Therefore, many proposed corporate reforms are 
short-sighted because they aim to tweak the power balance between cor-
porate managers and the traditional shareholders—direct owners. The 
agency paradigm should be modernized to incorporate the unique inter-
ests of mutual fund investors with a definition of shareholder that in-
cludes this growing class of citizen shareholders. 
III. GROWING CORPORATE SPACES IN SOCIETY 
The economic reality of corporate functions, investments, and in-
terconnectivity further supports incorporating the citizen shareholder 
identity into the agency paradigm. 
In 1932, Adolf Berle wrote that the “administration of corpora-
tions—peculiarly, a few hundred large corporations—is now the crux of 
                                                 
 142. For example, most 401(k) plans offer a variety of funds with different investment strate-
gies or goals, such as international equity-focused funds, fixed income funds, U.S. equity funds, 
target-date retirement funds, and bond funds. Those categories, particularly the international and 
U.S. equity funds, are often further subdivided to be an index fund to mirror the market and thus 
offer a sample of securities from the top performing companies listed on a certain exchange, or are 
categories according to the asset value of the participating companies (i.e., small, mid, and large 
capitalization funds), or whether the participating companies are considered to be value or growth 
securities. See, e.g., WellPoint 401K Retirement Savings Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.myplaniq 
.com/LTISystem/f401k_view.action?ID=993# (last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
 143. See, e.g., infra Figure 2: Interconnectedness between Mutual Funds, Corporate 401(k) 
Plans, and Corporate Sponsor of the Plan. 
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American industrial life.”144 The ubiquity of corporations has grown as 
evidenced, in part, by the burgeoning number of American households 
invested in the securities of publicly traded companies.145 As more invest 
in corporations, the capitalization levels of corporations rise,146 and with 
that the production and revenue power of those corporations increase. 
The rise in corporate revenues has also been accompanied by an emer-
gence of private entities performing public functions, such as health care, 
retirement savings, and participation in the political process. 
The result is that “corporate spaces” in society are increasing. I use 
the phrase corporate spaces to refer to the size and scope of corporations 
in terms of revenue amounts, number of employees, and number of in-
vestors. It also reflects the concentration of wealth among the top com-
panies,147 demonstrating the tremendous power that can be wielded by a 
few private actors. Additionally, the phrase encompasses the public func-
tions performed by corporations and how economic interests are inextri-
cably intertwined with social and political interests, as discussed below. 
Using 2010 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) figures from the World 
Bank and publicly available information about 2010 corporate revenues, 
I created a ranking of the top economies in the world, including both pri-
vate (corporations) and public economies (countries).148 Similar figures 
have been relied upon in corporate law scholarship, but much of it is now 
out-dated.149 My results, based on 2010 data, are consistent with earlier 
conclusions from older data. 150 
                                                 
 144. A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365, 1365 (1932). 
 145. See supra notes 52–56; see also Harrison Hong et. al., Social Interaction and Stock-
Market Participation, 59 J. FIN. 137, 137–38 (2004), available at http://economics.harvard.edu/ 
faculty/stein/files/Social_InteractionJofF.pdf (discussing the growing trend of stock ownership and 
the reasons for it). 
 146. See Palmiter, supra note 30, at 1428 (noting the recent “influx of individual investors into 
the capital markets . . . .”). 
 147. For example, looking at 2010 data, the top 5% of companies whose primary listing is on 
an American stock exchange accounted for “70% ($10.6 trillion) of the market value and 90% ($765 
billion) of the total profit . . . .” They Are the 5%, supra note 31. 
 148. See infra Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010; Table 8: Top 100 Corporations 
by Revenue in 2010. 
 149. While corporate law scholarship has included similar claims, the data supporting those 
claims were from the late 1990s. I did not originally intend to do original research for this Article, 
but concluded that the earlier assertions were an important component of my argument, and if to be 
included, had to be modernized. See, e.g., Siebecker, supra note 149, at 171; Tsoutsoura, supra note 
149, at 4. 
 150. Compare this data to a 1999 study of the top 100 economies of the world, measured by the 
GDP and corporate revenue, which revealed that 51 were U.S.-based corporations and 49 were coun-
tries. SARAH ANDERSON & JOHN CAVENAGH, INST. OF POLICY STUDIES, TOP 200: THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE GLOBAL POWER 3 (2000), available at http://www.ips-dc.org/files/2452/top200.pdf; see 
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In 2010, 43 of the top 100 economies in the world were corpora-
tions, 33 of which are traded on U.S. exchanges or are U.S.-based.151 The 
100 top-earning corporations ranked among the top 162 economies of the 
world. Demonstrating a strong concentration of corporate rankings in the 
100−162 range, 57 companies ranked between numbers 100 and 162 of 
the top economies of the world.152 Of the 100 top-earning corporations 
discussed herein, 65 are U.S.-based corporations or are traded on U.S.-
regulated exchanges.153 
 
Figure 1: Top Economies in 2010 
 
                                                                                                             
also Michael Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United, 79 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 161, 171 (2010) (describing the influence of corporations in modern society in terms of 
political voice and economic power); Margarita Tsoutsoura, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Financial Performance 5 (Mar. 2004) (unpublished working paper), available at http://www 
.escholarship.org/us/item/111799p2 (describing prior research exploring the link between financial 
success and corporate social responsibility and describing current methodologies that confirm the 
existence of a positive correlation); Trade Liberalization Statistics, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.gatt.org/trastat_e.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2011) (“51 of the 100 largest economies in the 
world are corporations. The Top 500 multinational corporations account for nearly 70 percent of the 
worldwide trade; this percentage has steadily increased over the past twenty years.” (citing Corpo-
rate Globalization Fact Sheet, CORPWATCH, (Mar. 22, 2001), http://www.corpwatch.org/arti 
cle.php?id=378)). 
 151. See infra Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010; Table 8: Top 100 Corporations 
by Revenue in 2010. 
 152. See infra Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010; Table 8: Top 100 Corporations 
by Revenue in 2010. 
 153. See infra Table 8: Top 100 Corporations by Revenue in 2010. 
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This section provides data documenting the public functions of 3 of 
the top 100 corporations: Wal-Mart (ranked the #1 corporation and #24 
on the integrated list); International Business Machines (IBM) (ranked as 
the #48 corporation and #106 on the integrated list); and WellPoint 
(ranked the #100 corporation and #162 on the integrated list).154 Addi-
tionally, this section discusses companies’ relationship to and depend-
ence on the securities market by discussing their 401(k) plans and institu-
tional investors. Later, in Part III.B, I discuss the case study companies in 
greater detail. 
The scale of the modern corporation is expanding on all fronts—
increasing in the number of investors, size, and concentration of econom-
ic power. This increase in corporate spaces raises questions probing both 
the actual and the ideal relationship between corporations and society.155 
A. Public Functions of Private Entities 
The ways in which private entities have evolved to serve increas-
ingly public functions suggests that corporate space in society is increas-
ing. Corporate involvement with public functions further emphasizes the 
significance of the citizen shareholder identity, one that captures the in-
terests and realities of a majority of investors. Berle wrote that a “major 
function” of the modern American corporation is to “provide safety, se-
curity, or means of support for that part of the community . . . .”156 In 
other words: private entities perform public functions. Corporations earn 
returns for investors and employ a workforce, both private functions; 
corporations are also key actors in the provision of health insurance, the 
building of individual retirement savings, and the election of candidates 
for office, all public functions.157 
                                                 
 154. Id. 
155. The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic power 
which can compete on equal terms with the modern state—economic power versus politi-
cal power, each strong in its own field. The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the 
corporation while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, makes every effort 
to avoid such regulation. Where its own interests are concerned, it even attempts to dom-
inate the state. The future may see the economic organism now typified by the corpora-
tion, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possible even superseding it as the 
dominant form of social organization. The law of corporations, accordingly, might well 
be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new economic state, while business 
practice is increasingly assuming the aspect of economic statesmanship. 
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 357. 
 156. Berle, supra note 145, at 1365. 
 157. Wade, supra note 37, at 325. (“When private companies manage prisons, public schools, 
and hospitals, and distribute welfare benefits, the inmates, students, patients, and welfare recipients 
they purport to serve become human commodities that are more like the widgets manufactured by 
more typical corporations than they are like the constituencies of traditional companies.”). 
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If corporations are private entities, when, how, and why did they 
begin performing public functions?158 Are corporations larger and more 
widely invested in because of the public functions that they serve, or do 
they serve increasingly public functions because of the size or scale of 
corporations, which is fueled in part by investments? The answers are 
difficult to pinpoint because corporate space impacts the terms of in-
vestment and the public roles performed by corporations that, in turn, 
augment the space that corporations occupy in society. The cycle is easi-
est to see in the context of retirement savings where stock investment is 
the predominant (and growing) means of individual saving for retire-
ment, which in turn impacts the space that corporations occupy. Tax in-
centives, default rules like automatic enrollment, and information asym-
metries between mutual fund managers and the average investor, all en-
courage employee participation in corporate-sponsored retirement plans. 
As more citizens are invested in securities for the purpose of individual 
retirement savings, the link between the activities of private enterprises 
and the financial security of the country as a whole is evident: private 
entities with public impact. 
The assumed dichotomy between public and private functions,159 
which is a foundational principle in corporate law, no longer reflects the 
corporate reality in which a majority of Americans invest. It is a tenet of 
corporate law that corporations are private entities,160 created by the 
state,161 governed by contract,162 and subject only to certain state and, 
where applicable, federal regulations.163 Because corporations are private 
                                                 
 158. For a discussion of the early connection between private entities and public functions, 
specifically in the railroad industry, see JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, A 
HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 132–66 (1997). 
 159. Id.; see also Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 68–70 (2009). 
 160. See Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational “Real 
Entity” Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575 (1989). See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATE LAW 12–29 (2nd ed. 2009). 
 161. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 161, at 12–13; FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, 
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 12 (1991) (noting the “many actors” who collec-
tively participate in the firm); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Con-
tracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4, 25 (2002) (referencing state corporate law statutes as the foundation of 
corporate law); Bebchuk, supra note 2, at 844 (“Although different states within the United States 
have different corporate codes, these codes have many similarities.”). 
 162. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 162, at 12; Bainbridge, supra note 162, at 9–11. 
 163. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §101 (2011) (establishing the requirements for forming 
and maintaining a corporation); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (2010) (establishing disclosure requirements for 
directors and officers with ownership interests of 10% or more). 
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entities, often viewed as associations of their owners (shareholders),164 
corporations are vested with certain rights that are similar to or derivative 
from those held by individual shareholders.165 The agency paradigm is 
premised on the need for corporate law to ensure that those who control a 
corporation do so in service to the individual owners. As already ex-
plained, the identity of a “shareholder” is evolving. This section discuss-
es how corporations’ roles are also evolving, and whether those changes 
justify modernizing the agency paradigm to accommodate the full scope 
of interests held by modern investors. I conclude that yoking public func-
tions to the function of private enterprises further demonstrates the need 
to supplement the traditional shareholder identity with that of the citizen 
shareholder. 
B. Case Study Company Data: The Public Functions of Wal-Mart, 
IBM, and WellPoint 
 
The case studies illustrate the arguments made in this section—that 
corporations are performing increasingly public functions, that corpora-
tions are interconnected, and that modern shareholders’ economic inter-
ests are related to and have an impact on social and political interests. 
This section presents data related to the top (Wal-Mart), middle (IBM), 
and bottom (WellPoint) U.S.-based companies on the top 100 corporate 
revenue list.166 This section also identifies the public actions of these 
                                                 
164. If the First Amendment has any force, it prohibits Congress from fining or jailing 
citizens, or associations of citizens, for simply engaging in political speech. If the 
antidistortion rationale were to be accepted, however, it would permit Government to ban 
political speech simply because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corpo-
rate form. 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 904 (2010). 
165. All the provisions of the Bill of Rights set forth the rights of individual men and 
women—not, for example, of trees or polar bears. But the individual person’s right to 
speak includes the right to speak in association with other individual persons. Surely the 
dissent does not believe that speech by the Republican Party or the Democratic Party can 
be censored because it is not the speech of “an individual American.” It is the speech of 
many individual Americans, who have associated in a common cause, giving the leader-
ship of the party the right to speak on their behalf. The association of individuals in a 
business corporation is no different—or at least it cannot be denied the right to speak on 
the simplistic ground that it is not “an individual American.” 
Id. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Amy J. Sepinwall, Guilty by Proxy: Expanding the 
Boundaries of Responsibility in the Face of Corporate Crime, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 411, 427–30 
(2012). 
 166. See Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government Institutional Investors in Case 
Study Companies.  
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three private entities and demonstrates how the broader interests of citi-
zen shareholders are impacted by corporate action.  
 








Provide Health Insurance Yes Yes Yes 
Provide 401(k)  Yes Yes Yes 
Political Spending Yes No Yes 
Political Action Committee Yes No Yes 






All three companies provide health insurance to employees.173 Sim-
ilarly, all three provide 401(k) plans for employees. Not surprisingly, the 
funds provided in the three companies’ 401(k) plans include funds in the 
                                                 
 167. 401(k) participation is available to full- and part-time employees, but health care coverage 
is limited to full-time employees at Wal-Mart, and is uncertain for IBM and WellPoint, although 
their business models are unlikely to be as reliant on part-time employees as the major retail chain is. 
 168. Careers: Benefits, WALMART, http://walmartstores.com/careers/7750.aspx (last visited 
May 8, 2012). 
 169. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, INC., http://www.ibm.com (last visited May 8, 
2012); see also Pay & Benefits, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/employment/us/li_pay_benefits 
.shtml; IBM Policies, IBM, http://www.ibm.com/ibm/responsibility/policy5.shtml (last visited May 
8, 2012) (“It is IBM’s long-standing policy that we participate in politics as private citizens, not as 
IBMers. Therefore, it is the policy of the IBM Company not to make contributions of resources such 
as money, goods or services to political candidates or parties. This policy applies equally in all coun-
tries where IBM does business, regardless of whether or not such contributions are considered legal 
in any host country.”). 
 170. WELLPOINT, INC., http://www.wellpoint.com/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2012); Wellness Pro-
grams, WELLPOINT, http://www.careersatwellpoint.com/Wellness-Program.aspx; Benefits, 
WELLPOINT, http://www.careersatwellpoint.com/Benefits.aspx?clicked=0 (last visited May 8, 2012); 
Wellpoint, Inc. Wellpac-2010 FEC PAC-Qualified Committee, FIND THE DATA, http://fec-political-
committees.findthedata.org/l/7505/Wellpoint-Inc-Wellpac (last visited May 8, 2012). Note that 
WellPoint is the parent of Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Anthem entities, and thus, their contributions 
are included in the data reported directly above. 
 171. Annual Lobbying by Wal-Mart Stores, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00093054&cycle=2010 (last visited May 8, 2012). 
 172. This figure includes the spending of subsidiaries like Blue Cross/Blue Shield and Anthem. 
Wellpac-2010 FEC PAC-Qualified Committee, supra note 171; Blue Cross/Blue Shield Client Pro-
file: Summary, 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000 
000109&year=2010. 
 173. See supra notes 169−71. 
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top mutual fund companies (see Table 3).  Political spending is discussed 
separately below in Part III.E. 
 
Table 3: Mutual Funds Included in Case Study 401(k) Plans 
 
Top Mutual Funds Part of Wal-Mart 401(k)174 




Vanguard Ø 12 funds 15 funds 
American 1 fund Ø 2 funds 
Fidelity 2 funds Ø Ø 
PIMCO 2 funds 2 funds 1 fund 
BlackRock 1 fund Ø Ø 
Total funds offered 16 funds 21 funds 30 funds 
 
                                                 
 174. Wal-Mart Profit Sharing and 401(k) Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.myplaniq.com/LTI 
System/f401k_view.action?ID=995 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). Plan options include the following: 
American Funds EuroPacific Blend, Barclays iShares Foreign Blend Index Trust, Laudus Mondrian 
International Equity Trust, Fidelity Advisor International Small Capital Equity Trust, iShares Russell 
1000 Index, David NY Venture A, Rainier Large Capital Equity Index, Dreyfus/The Boston Compa-
ny Small/Mid Capital Growth Fund, GAMCO Westwood Small Cap Equity Fund, BlackRock Infla-
tion Protected Bond, PIMCO Total Return Bond Fund, Prudential Core Plus Bond III, Stable Value 
Government Bonds, PIMCO All Asset Institutional Index, and Fidelity Advisor Global Balanced 
Asset Fund. Id. 
 175. International Business Machines (IBM) 401K Plus Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.my 
planiq.com/LTISystem/f401k_view.action?ID=675# (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). Plan funds include 
the following: ING Global Real Estate, Vanguard REIT Index, Vanguard Pacific Stock Index, Van-
guard European Stock Index, State Street Global Advisors, International Stock Selection, PIMCO 
Commodity fund, PIMCO Emerging Markets Bond, Vanguard Inflation-Protected Bonds, Vanguard 
Long-Term Investment-Grade Bonds, Vanguard Short-Term Bond index, Vanguard Large Cap 
Index, Vanguard Total Stock Market Index, Vanguard Growth Index, Vanguard Value Index, State 
Street Global Advisors Small/Mid Capital Fund, Vanguard Small Capital Growth Index, Vanguard 
Small Capital Value Index, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Total Bond Market, and a money market 
account. Id. 
 176. WellPoint 401K Retirement Savings Plan, MY PLAN IQ, http://www.myplaniq.com/LTI 
System/f401k_view.action?ID=993# (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). Participating funds include the 
following: Dimensional Fund Advisors Emerging Markets, Vanguard Total International Stock 
Index, Van Kampen International Growth Fund, PIMCO Total Return Bond Fund, Vanguard Total 
Bond Market Index, Vanguard Institutional Index, Wells Fargo Advantage Index Fund, American 
Funds Growth Fund of America, Touchstone Sands Capital Select Growth Fund, Vanguard 
PRIMECAP Fund, American Beacon Large Capital Value Fund, Vanguard Windsor II Large Value 
Fund, Vanguard Mid-Capitalization Index Fund, Vanguard Explorer Small Growth Fund, Wells 
Fargo Advantage Small Capital Growth Fund, Goldman Sachs Small Capital Value Fund, Vanguard 
Wellington Fund, Vanguard Target Retirement Income Fund, Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones  
Target Fund, Vanguard Money Market Fund, Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2010, Van-
guard Target Retirement 2015 Fund, Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2030 Fund, Van-
guard Target Retirement 2035 Fund, Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2040 Fund, Van-
guard Target Retirement 2045 Fund, and Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target 2050 Fund. Id. 
2012] The Citizen Shareholder 1337 
  
The case study companies also serve as an investment source for 
many of the top companies and top mutual funds discussed in this Arti-
cle, as well as to government pension plans.177 Securities Exchange 
Commission form 13F178 filings identify institutional investors, of a cer-
tain size, with holdings in publicly traded companies, including the case 
study companies.179 While all of the top mutual funds are invested in the 
case study companies to some degree, seven of the eleven mutual funds 
discussed above own 200,000 shares or more in the case study compa-
nies180 For an additional illustration of the level of intra-company in-
vestment, see Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government 
Institutional Investors in Case Study Companies, included in the Appen-
dix, ranking institutional investors among the top 100 companies, top 
mutual funds discussed herein, and government pension plans in the 
three case study companies. 
 
   
                                                 
 177. See infra Table 4: Top Mutual Fund Funds with 200,000 Shares or More in Case Study 
Companies (2010); Table 5: Top Mutual Funds in 2010. 
 178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2011); see also Form 13(f)—Reports Filed by Institutional Invest-
ment Managers, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/form 
13f.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
         179.  Form 13F is a report required by the SEC for institutional investment managers with 
more than $100M assets under their control, including banks, insurance companies, broker/dealers, 
corporations, and pension funds.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (2011); SECURITIES & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, Division of Investment Management, Frequently Asked Questions about Form 13F , 
(Sept. 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm. 
 180. The cut-off point for tracking investments is an arbitrary selection made by the author. 
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Table 4: Top Mutual Fund Funds with Significant Investment  
in Case Study Companies181 
 
Mutual Funds Invested in Wal-Mart 
Invested in 
IBM 
Invested in  
WellPoint 
Vanguard x x x 
American    
Fidelity x x x 
PIMCO    
TIAA-CREF x x x 
Franklin Templeton    
T. Rowe Price x x x 
Columbia    
Oppenheimer Funds x x x 
JP Morgan x x x 
BlackRock x x x 
 
Table 4 highlights the interconnectedness of corporate investment.  
This point is further illustrated by the following diagram: 
 
Figure 2: Interconnectedness Between Mutual Funds, Corporate 401(k) 
Plans, and Corporate Sponsor of the Plan. 
                                                 
 181. List of Section 13(f) filings for the case study companies on file with the author. 
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Figure 2 illustrates the level of investment between the case study 
companies and the top mutual funds. The results are not surprising, but 
the visual representation conveys more than words alone. Each of the 
three case study companies are listed along with the names of the top 
mutual funds participating in their 401(k) plans. For Wal-Mart, the fund 
participants are American Funds, Fidelity, PIMCO, and BlackRock; for 
IBM, the participants are Vanguard and PIMCO; for WellPoint, the par-
ticipants are American Funds, PIMCO, and Vanguard. Each of the top 
mutual fund family participants has some level of investment182 in each 
of the three case study companies, with T.Rowe Price, Oppenheimer, JP 
Morgan Chase and TIAA-CREF having reported holdings of over 
200,000. 
This interconnectedness provides another justification for concep-
tualizing modern mutual fund investors as citizen shareholders. Moreo-
ver, corporate interconnectedness underscores the universal investor the-
ory: what a modern investor owns is a share in the market as a whole, not 
a share in an individual company.183 The diagram illustrates that risk is 
not isolated to one company or even within one industry for the citizen 
shareholder. The financial health of corporations—and therefore the fi-
nancial health of their investors—depends on the health of other corpora-
tions and the market as a whole. 
Additionally, the level of intra-company and mutual fund invest-
ment in the top companies demonstrates how closely tied personal re-
tirement savings are to corporate performance. Corporations, as private 
entities, perform a public function by serving as the foundation of indi-
vidual retirement savings. The number of government-sponsored pension 
funds invested in the case study companies further evidences this public 
function. For example, of the reported institutional investors owning 
200,000 shares of stock or more in the case study companies, forty were 
government-sponsored pension plans.184 This also means that while the 
                                                 
 182. Here I am discussing any corporate investment, not a significant investment of 200,000 
shares or .01% as gathered from form 13(f) filings. 
 183. Fairfax, supra note 78, at 83–85; HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 28, at 21. 
 184. See infra Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government Institutional Investors in 
Case Study Companies. Institutional investors are listed in rank order by size of holdings, from 
largest to smallest until the cut-off threshold of 200,000 shares. Wal-Mart had twenty registered, 
U.S. public pension investors in 2010: CALPERS; N.Y. State Common Ret. Fund; N.Y. State 
Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; Fla. State Bd. of Admin.; Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; State of Wis. Inv. Bd.; 
State of N.J. Common Pension Fund; Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys.; State Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ohio; 
Tex. Teacher Ret. Sys.; Va. Ret. Sys.; State Treasurer of Mich.; Colo. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n; Tex. 
Permanent Sch. Fund; Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex.; Pub. Sector Pension Inv. Bd.; Commonwealth of Pa. 
Pub. Schs.; Ky. Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; N.M. Educ. Ret. Bd.; and Or. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. IBM had 
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stock market investment numbers are currently at 54% of American 
households, there is an even greater number of people (households de-
pendent on government-backed pensions for retirement savings) for 
whom the private performance of corporations will determine, in part, 
their individual economic stability. 
C. Growing Corporate Spaces: Health Care 
As demonstrated with the case studies, providing health insurance 
to employees is one way that private corporations perform a public func-
tion that impacts individuals.185 Employer-provided health insurance as a 
form of employee benefit is a primary means through which Americans 
obtain health insurance coverage.186 In 2010, 45% of Americans received 
health insurance through an employer-based plan.187 Compare that with 
the 25% of Americans who received health insurance through the gov-
ernment in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, and military/veterans insur-
ance, and the 17% of Americans who remain uninsured.188 
Access to health care is a meaningful measure of economic and so-
cial stability and is tracked domestically and internationally as an indica-
tor of stability and health.189 Heath care is internationally considered a 
                                                                                                             
seventeen registered, U.S. public pension investors in 2010: N.Y. State Common Ret. Fund; 
CALPERS; N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; Fla. State Bd. of Admin.; Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; 
State of Wis. Inv. Bd.; Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys.; State Teachers Ret. Sys. of Ohio; Colo. Pub. 
Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n; N.J. Div. of Inv.; Tex. Teacher Ret. Sys.; Tex. Permanent Sch. Fund; State 
Treasurer of Mich.; Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex.; Ky. Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; Commonwealth of Pa. Pub. 
Schs.; and Va. Ret. Sys. WellPoint had twelve registered, U.S. public pension investors in 2010: 
N.Y. State Common Ret. Fund; CALPERS; N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; State Teachers Ret. Sys. 
of Ohio; Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys.; State of Wis. Inv. Bd.; Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex.; Ohio Pub. 
Emps. Ret. Sys.; State of N.J. Common Pension Fund; Colo. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Ass’n; Tex. Perma-
nent Sch. Fund; and State Treasurer of Mich.   
 185. See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 34, at 852 (“[T]he corporation, as the nation’s 
primary employer, becomes the primary supplier of employee welfare provisions preferred by the 
state . . . ,” including health insurance.). 
 186. See, e.g., Danny King, Fewer Americans Get Employer Health Insurance, DAILY 
FINANCE.COM, (Mar. 7. 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/03/07/fewer-americans-get-em 
ployer-health-insurance/ (asserting that employer-provided health insurance accounts for the cover-
age of 45% of Americans). 
 187. Elizabeth Mendes, Employer-Based Health Insurance Continues to Trend Down, GALLUP 
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150692/Employer-Based-Health-Insurance-Continues-
Trend-Down.aspx. 
 188. Id. 
 189. MARK W. STANTON, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY, EMPLOYER-
SPONSORED HEALTH INSURANCE: TRENDS IN COST AND ACCESS, (2004), available at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/research/empspria/empspria.htm; John M. Eisenberg & Elaine J. Power, Trans-
forming Insurance Coverage Into Quality Health Care: Voltage Drops From Potential to Delivered 
Quality, JAMA, Oct. 25, 2000, at 2100, 2101. 
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human right190 and remains at the center of political debates in the United 
States.191 Health insurance is one way to ensure appropriate access to 
health care and is an indicator of overall health.192 Private employers, 
                                                 
190. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and neces-
sary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, dis-
ability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his con-
trol. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (iii) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(iii), art. 25 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the en-
joyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the 
healthy development of the child; 
(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; 
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases; 
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical at-
tention in the event of sickness. 
United Nations, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 12 (1966). 
 191. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 
1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2011) (challenging the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Afforda-
ble Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010)); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 608 (2011) (granting cert. review for 648 F.3d 1235 on the severability issue); 
Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (granting cert. on the minimum 
coverage issue in Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235); Florida v. Dept. of Human & Health 
Servs., 132 S. Ct. 604 (2011) (granting cert. review for Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen., 648 F.3d 1235, on 
the issue of Congress’s spending power and ability to link federal funding to state compliance). CNN 
reports on its “Top Campaign Issues” that health care is a top issue and provides further commen-
tary: 
Most Republican candidates are pushing to “repeal and replace” much of the health care 
reform bill passed by a Democratically controlled Congress and signed into law by Presi-
dent Obama in spring 2010. The law has proved less popular than Obama and Democrats 
anticipated when they used considerable political capital to pass it. But the GOP is also 
exposed on health care. Gov. Mitt Romney is plagued by comparisons between the Dem-
ocratic law and a similar bill he supported and signed while governor of Massachusetts. 
Election Center: Top Campaign Issues, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2012/campaign-
issues.html. 
192. Health care coverage promotes access to medical goods and services, as well as 
providing financial security against unexpected or serious illness . . . . Most OECD coun-
tries have achieved near-universal coverage of health-care costs for a core set of services, 
which usually include consultations with doctors and specialists, tests and examinations, 
and surgical and therapeutic procedures. 
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (OECD), HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2011: OECD INDICATORS 
132, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/28/49105858.pdf. The United States is one of four 
OCED countries that does not provide universal health coverage. Id. The OECD cautions that “[t]he 
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many of whom are corporations, provide health insurance for nearly half 
of all Americans and by doing so perform a public function. 
When corporations are the predominant providers of health insur-
ance (through employee benefit plans), private economic conditions in-
fluence the provision of that public function. Combining shareholder re-
turns and health insurance in the same analysis demonstrates the blend-
ing of economic, social, and political interests for investors and citizens 
alike. For example, the number of Americans with health insurance has 
been declining since the economic crisis in 2008; the sharpest decline, in 
fact, is among individuals who receive their health insurance through 
employer-sponsored plans.193 For example, in 2011, Wal-Mart—the larg-
est revenue-producing company, ranked as the 24th largest economy in 
the world,194 and the largest private employer195—announced a new poli-
cy that it would not provide health insurance for new, part-time employ-
ees.196 Corporate policies are likely to impact health insurance coverage 
rates directly and access to health care indirectly. In the face of insurance 
premium increases at 9% a year, the debate regarding health care cover-
age and its implications for business (and vice versa) is likely to contin-
ue.197 
The issue of health insurance can serve as a lens through which to 
examine the bifurcated interests of citizen shareholders. This issue has 
direct economic consequences for corporate returns as well as discernible 
social and political consequences. Discussing health insurance solely in 
light of the economic interests of shareholders overlooks an important 
component of the interests involved, particularly when half of Americans 
                                                                                                             
problem of persistent uninsurance is a major barrier to receiving health care, and more broadly, to 
reducing health inequalities among population groups . . . .” Id. 
 193. Mendes, supra note 187; see also King, supra note 186. 
 194. See infra Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010. 
 195. Nation’s Largest Employers, NEW YORK JOB SOURCE, http://nyjobsource.com/largestem 
ployers.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2012); see also America’s Ten Largest Employers, 24/7 WALL 
STREET, http://247wallst.com/2011/04/24/americas-ten-largest-employers (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) 
(“Wal-Mart is both the largest private employer in the world as well as the largest company ranked 
by annual revenue.”). 
 196. Mendes, supra note 187; Steven Greenhouse & Reed Abelson, Wal-Mart Cuts Some 
Health Care Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/business/ 
wal-mart-cuts-some-health-care-benefits.html?pagewanted=all. 
The increased cost of health insurance is a central fact in any discussion of health policy 
and health delivery. As annual premiums surge beyond $13,000 for an average family, 
costs are blamed for rising uninsured and ‘under-insurance.’ For those Americans who 
are fully-covered, these cost realities affect employers, both large and small . . . . 
Health Insurance: Premiums and Increases, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
(Aug. 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14514. 
 197. Greenhouse & Abelson, supra note 196. 
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are invested in the stock market and nearly the same number of people 
obtain their insurance from the companies listed thereon. 
For example, this Article focuses on citizen shareholders—mutual 
fund investors participating in employer-sponsored plans—who have an 
interest in market stability and performance as a whole. A corporate de-
cision regarding health insurance may impact both the workforce and the 
market as a whole. For example, the recently excluded part-time employ-
ees without medical insurance may see doctors less, buy fewer prescrip-
tion drugs and health-related products, as well as incur higher costs asso-
ciated with emergency care needs exacerbated by delayed treatment. 
While enduring these economic consequences, if the employee also in-
vests in a 401k plan, she is likely to be indirectly invested in Wal-Mart 
through several avenues (mutual fund invested in Wal-Mart and compa-
nies included in fund also are likely to hold Wal-Mart stock). 
D. Growing Corporate Spaces: Retirement 
As documented above, investment through employer-sponsored re-
tirement plans is the primary method of market entry for citizen share-
holders and demonstrates the growing dependence of Americans on the 
performance of the market as a means to secure individual financial sta-
bility. 
The fastest growing class of private investment is in mutual funds 
through the proliferation of employer-sponsored retirement vehicles such 
as the 401(k) and other defined contribution plans.198 Private wealth sav-
ings,199 largely for retirement,200 is achieved primarily through 401(k) 
                                                 
 198. Employer-sponsored plans are also called defined contribution plans and include the 
401(k) plans, 403(b) plans, and 457 plans for government employees. Individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs) 
were designed with two goals when they were created in 1974 under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA). First, they provide individuals not covered by 
workplace retirement plans with an opportunity to save for retirement on their own. Se-
cond, they allow workers who are leaving jobs a means to preserve the tax benefits and 
growth opportunities that employer-sponsored retirement plans provide. 
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 103–104, 112. 
199. It is a matter of experience that during two periods of man’s life, childhood and old 
age, he can not support himself; and that sickness, childbearing, and incidental economic 
readjustments will make even further lacunae. The only bridge, in our system, to cover 
these gaps is private property. The common law has based its whole fabric on this prem-
ise. 
Berle, supra note 145, at 1369. 
200. Mutual funds play a key role in achieving both the long- and short-term savings 
goals of U.S. households. In 2010, 74 percent of mutual fund-owning households indicat-
ed that their primary financial goal for their fund investments was saving for retirement. 
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plans, whereby an employer partners with an investment company to of-
fer investment opportunities to the employees through a limited offering 
of special funds and products.201 The “choice” to invest is limited and 
often encouraged by the pre-tax investment advantages and possibility 
for employer matching funds.202 
Similarly, the choice regarding how to invest is also limited and 
constrained by the employer-sponsored plan. The nearly compulsory na-
ture of stock ownership makes such investments closely mirror an em-
ployment tax with a residual, long-term personal benefit, much like the 
intended framework of social security. The tax-like nature of employee 
investment raises serious theoretical questions as to the appropriate role 
of corporations and the responsibilities they bear to the individual inves-
tors and to society, perhaps elevating concerns such as long-term stabil-
ity, sustainable practices, and research and development for longevity. 
Mutual funds have also been evolving. The pool of assets managed 
by U.S. mutual funds is increasing, as is the concentration of assets in the 
top funds. The twenty-five largest funds managed 60% of the mutual 
fund assets in 2000 and almost 75% in 2010.203 The market share of the 
                                                                                                             
Ninety-one percent of households that owned mutual funds held shares inside workplace 
retirement plans, individual retirement accounts (IRAs), and other tax-deferred accounts. 
Households were more likely to invest their retirement assets in long-term mutual funds 
than in money market funds. Defined contribution (DC) retirement plans and IRA assets 
held in stock, bond, and hybrid mutual funds totaled $4.3 trillion in 2010 and accounted 
for 48 percent of those funds’ assets, whereas retirement account assets in money market 
funds were $351 billion, or 13% of those funds’ assets. 
ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 84. 
 201. Taub, supra note 5, at 851. 
 202. Id.; see also The 401k Advantage, PROFIT SHARING/401K COUNCIL OF AMERICA, http:// 
www.401k.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uEnqkTNfg14%3D&tabid=71&mid=410 (last visited Apr. 
5, 2012) (“401(k) contributions are made pretax, which means that when your money goes into the 
plan it is not subject to federal income tax or most state and local income taxes. Likewise, invest-
ment earnings on your savings are not taxed until they are withdrawn from the plan.”); Lee Ann 
Obringer, How 401 K Plans Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://money.howstuffworks.com/per 
sonal-finance/retirement-planning/401k2.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
“Without the tax incentives, Section 401(k) plans would just become an investment account with a 
great deal of restrictions on the accounts.” Beckett G. Cantley, The Cure Causes New Symptoms: 
Capital Control Effects of Tax Enforcement, Gold Regulation, and Retirement Reform, 7 S.C. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 75, 106 (2010) (discussing the effect on 401(k) plans if government-regulated ac-
counts became the new mechanism for individual retirement savings and the tax advantage of 401(k) 
plans was eliminated). 
 203. The top eleven mutual funds, by asset values, are listed in Table 5. “The share of assets 
managed by the largest 25 firms increased to 74 percent in 2010 from 68 percent in 2000.” ICI 2011 
FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 23. 
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top eleven funds is almost 55%,204 achieved, in part, by participating in 
employer-sponsored retirement plans. 
The top mutual funds are listed below in Table 5. 
 




(in U.S. $ million) 
Market 
Share207 
Vanguard 1,200,000 15.58% 
American 814,000 11.01% 
Fidelity 743,000 10.05% 
TIAA-CREF208 453,000 5.8% 
PIMCO 449,000 6.07% 
Franklin Templeton 323,000 4.37% 
T. Rowe Price 247,000 3.34% 
Columbia 146,000 1.97% 
Oppenheimer Funds 131,000 1.78% 
JP Morgan 130,000 1.75% 
BlackRock 127,000 1.72% 
 
Unsurprisingly, there is a significant cross-investment among the 
mutual funds listed herein (Table 5), and the top 100 companies, listed in 
Table 8.  
                                                 
 204. Id. (“In addition, the share of assets managed by the largest 10 firms in 2010 was 53 per-
cent, up from the 44 percent share managed by the largest 10 firms in 2000.”). 
 205. Largest Mutual Fund Firms, INVESTMENT NEWS, http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/ 
pbcs.dll/gallery?Site=CI&Date=20111012&Category=free&ArtNo=101209993&Ref=PH&Params=
Itemnr=1 (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (based on data available from Morningstar’s Fund Flow Direct 
Database at http://corporate.morningstar.com/US/asp/subject.aspx?xmlfile=2955.xml&ad=van). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. Market share indicated by the Investment News ranking is based on a U.S. Mutual 
fund market of $7.69 trillion assets. The 2011 Investment Company Factbook, however, reports the 
total U.S. mutual fund market at $11.8 trillion. ICI 2011 FACTBOOK, supra note 13, at 197. The 
market share percentage for TIAA-CREF is calculated from the $7.69 trillion number used in the 
rest of the rankings. 
 208. Press Release, TIAA-CREF, TIAA-CREF and the Future Fund Partner on Ownership of 
685 Third Avenue Tower, (Mar. 9, 2011), available at http://www.tiaa-cref.org/public/about/press/ 
about_us/releases/pressrelease376.html (“With more than USD$453 billion in combined assets under 
management as of December 31, 2010, TIAA-CREF is best known as the leading provider of retire-
ment services in the academic, research, medical and cultural fields and one of the largest institu-
tional real estate investors in the U.S.”); see also Who We Serve, TIAA-CREF, http://www.tiaa-cref 
.org/public/about/identity/who_we_serve/index.html (Apr. 5, 2012). 
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Private investment, which serves the quasi-public function of re-
tirement savings, generates private economic power and fuels concentra-
tion of wealth.209 As discussed in Part II, the nature of modern stock 
ownership—through employer-sponsored retirement funds—erodes tra-
ditional, market-based checks on old agency problems in corporations. It 
also increases the need for the system of investment to work fairly and 
appropriately for both the security of the individual investor, as well as 
for society which is dependent on the private provision of a public safety 
net.210 
E. Growing Corporate Spaces: Political Speech 
As seen with the case study companies, political speech is a third 
way in which corporations, as private entities, participate in or serve a 
public function.211 Corporate actions funded by corporate treasuries have 
decidedly political and democratic consequences.212 Even the SEC has 
recognized the uniquely political components of corporate actions, de-
scribing political contributions as the “type of social issue that might be 
significant to shareholders even though not significant to the bottom 
line.”213 Additionally, increasing corporate spaces have social and politi-
cal impact. “As corporations gain political power and encroach more 
deeply into territory once solely occupied by government, the private 
boardroom rather than the public forum represents the relevant battlefield 
for determining the most important aspects of our lives.”214 
                                                 
 209. See generally Edward A. Zelinksy, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 
451 (2004) (discussing the rise and role of defined contribution plans such as the 401(k)). 
 210. “The role of institutional investors is growing in many countries, with many economies 
moving away from ‘pay as you go’ retirement systems. This increased delegation of investment has 
raised the need for good corporate governance arrangements.” STIJN CLAESSENS, GLOBAL 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FORUM OF THE WORLD BANK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 7 (2003), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/cgf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Focus_1 
_CG_and_Development/$FILE/Focus_1_Corp_Governance_and_Development.pdf. 
 211. See, e.g., Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 141, at 392 (“[T]he Supreme Court used Citizens 
United as an opportunity to expand corporate speech rights by overturning Austin’s and McConnell’s 
limits on corporate political spending.”). 
212. The decisions affecting some of the most important aspects of our individual and 
communal lives now get made inside the boardroom rather than in the public 
eye . . . . [C]orporate actors may likely dominate the political agenda and the public opin-
ion on any matters that remain open for discussion in the public realm. In some real 
sense, the ability to direct corporate decisions represents the ability to control political 
life. 
Siebecker, supra note 149, at 164–65. 
 213. Bebchuk & Jackson, supra note 37 (citing to a 1996 no action letter). 
 214. Siebecker, supra note 149, at 169. 
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While restricted from making direct candidate donations,215 corpo-
rations participate in political speech through (1) contributions to politi-
cal action committees (PACs), (2) expenditures on direct lobbying ef-
forts, and (3) the use of corporate funds to encourage employees to sup-
port or oppose a particular candidate or issue.216 Corporations are active-
ly using the channels for political speech.217 For example, in 2010, re-
ported spending on lobbying was over $2.6 billion, with a majority com-
ing from corporations or corporate-backed organizations or associations 
such as the Chamber of Commerce.218 Additionally, § 441b of the 
McCain-Feingold Act contained exemptions for media corporations219 
and for communications of “non-profit organizations and political organ-
ization[s] if the communication is paid for exclusively by funds provided 
directly by individuals who are United States citizens or nationals or law-
fully admitted for permanent residence.”220 
                                                 
 215. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 
116 Stat. 81 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.) (addressing the increased 
role of soft money in campaign financing and the proliferation of issue-advocacy advertisements). 
Under § 441b, corporations were prohibited from “using general treasury funds to make direct con-
tributions to candidates or independent expenditures that expressly advocate the election or defeat of 
a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain qualified federal elections.” 
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010). 
 216. See KENT R. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 302 
(7th ed. 2011) (“Profit-making corporations . . . may support PACs and engage in partisan commu-
nication—including advocating the election of specific candidates—provided the communications 
are directed only to the corporate . . . ‘family.’ A corporation may use corporate funds to urge man-
agement, shareholders, and their families to vote for a specific candidate . . . .”). 
 217. For example, OpenSecrets.org reported on April 16, 2012 that outside groups such as 
parties, Super PACs, corporations, and other groups had spent $103,293,322 in the 2012 election. 
Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/. Corporations, 
available to fund independent political expenditures after the decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 130 
S. Ct. 876 (2010), provided Super PACs with 19% of their budgets in 2010 and 23% (thus far) in the 
2012 election cycle. T. W. Farnam, Corporations Are Sending More Contributions to Super PACs, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/corporations-are-sending-more-
contributions-to-super-pacs/2012/02/02/gIQAL4dYlQ_story.html. 
 218. Bennett Roth & Alex Knott, Lobbying Dollars Dip for the First Time in Years, ROLL 
CALL (Feb. 1, 2011), available at http://www.rollcall.com/issues/56_75/-202990-1.html; see also 
Who’s Up, Who’s Down, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/ (last 
visited Dec. 22, 2012) (providing data on total lobbying expenditures by year and breaking down 
annual and quarterly lobbying reports by industry and date). 
 219. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B) (“The term ‘expenditure’ does not include—(i) any news story, 
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, 
magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any polit-
ical party, political committee, or candidate . . . .”). 
 220. Id. § 441b(c)(2). Nonprofit corporations that were formed solely to promote political 
ideas, that did not collect funds from for-profit corporations, and that did not engage in business 
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The 2010 U.S. Supreme Court opinion Citizens United v. FEC221 
expanded avenues for corporate political speech by eliminating re-
strictions on political expenditures made by corporations and labor un-
ions that are uncoordinated with the candidate, the candidate’s commit-
tee, or the party.222 Outside spending, the type of political speech now 
available to corporations after Citizens United, is a rapidly growing cate-
gory, with significant increases in the 2010 midterm elections and pre-
dicted growth for 2012.223 The rapid growth in this category of spending 
is also attributable to the creation of the Super PAC. Super PACs are a 
fundraising entity created by the outcome of a federal court case, 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC,224 that expands the independent expenditure 
rights created in Citizens United.225 Super PACs are technically known as 
“independent expenditure-only committees” and can raise unlimited 
sums of money from corporations, unions, associations, and individuals, 
and then spend unlimited sums to overtly advocate for or against political 
candidates.226 
                                                                                                             
activities were also exempted from the restrictions on corporate expenditures under § 441b. FEC v. 
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986). 
 221. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
 222. See id. at 909 (“[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made 
by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”). Earlier, in Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Court had reasoned that uncoordinated expenditures undermine the 
value of such speech to the candidate and therefore decrease the threat of quid pro quo reciprocation 
from the candidate or elected official. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct at 908. 
 223. Dana Bash, Cash Flows in 2010 Cycle, CNN POLITICS, Oct. 27, 2010, http://politicalticker 
.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/27/cash-flows-in-2010-cycle; Outside Spending, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2012). 
 224. SpeechNow.org v. FEC., 599 F.3d 686 (2010) (holding unconstitutional a provision limit-
ing contributions by individuals to political committees that made only independent expenditures). 
“The FEC has applied Citizens United and SpeechNOW to allow unlimited contributions to, and 
expenditures by such PACs known as expenditure-only committees or SuperPACs.” Jan Witold 
Baran et al., Political Contributions and Expenditures by Corporations, 1901 PLI/Corp 137, 
153 (2011); see also FEC Advisory Opinion 2010-9; FEC Advisory Opinion 2010-11. 
225. But after recent changes in campaign finance laws, these newly empowered PACs 
are allowed to raise unlimited funds which they can donate to a campaign with few re-
strictions. Since the 2008 presidential race, “the biggest change is the growth of these su-
per PACs that can accept unlimited contributions and spend unlimited amounts,” said 
Anthony Corrado, a professor of government at Colby College in Waterville, Maine. 
Soaring PAC Donations May Fund a Shocking $6 Billion 2012 Election, RAW STORY (Nov. 3, 
2011), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/11/03/pac-donations-fund-6-billion-2012-election/. 
226. Technically known as independent expenditure-only committees, Super PACs may 
raise unlimited sums of money from corporations, unions, associations and individuals, 
then spend unlimited sums to overtly advocate for or against political candidates. Super 
PACs must, however, report their donors to the Federal Election Commission on a 
monthly or quarterly basis—the Super PACs choice—as a traditional PAC would. Unlike 
traditional PACs, Super PACs are prohibited from donating money directly to political 
candidates. 
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Through existing channels for corporate money to enter the politi-
cal debate and the increased avenues provided by independent expendi-
tures and Super PACs, the category of outside spending outpaced the 
overall increases in election spending by 565%227 between the 2006 and 
the 2010 midterm election years. The upcoming presidential election in 
2012 will further document the level of corporate involvement in the po-
litical debate for the election of federal candidates.228 While controversial 
as to the appropriate role of corporate political speech, the numbers 
demonstrate that corporate money is playing an undeniable role in politi-
cal elections. 
The following table demonstrates the increasing role that corporate-

















                                                                                                             
Super PACs, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/superpacs.php (last visited Feb. 
10, 2012). 
 227. The total cost of the 2006 midterm election cycle is reported at $2.85 billion, with $37 
million in independent expenditures. The total cost of the 2010 midterm election cycle was reported 
at $3.6 billion, with over $210 million in independent expenditures. The growth in overall cost of the 
election between 2006 and 2010 was 26%, whereas the increase in independent expenditures from 
these two cycles was 319%. The Money Behind the Elections, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.open 
secrets.org/bigpicture/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2012) (stating the reported costs of the elections); Total 
Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Political Parties, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www 
.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). Data after the 2012 
presidential election should provide a more complete picture regarding the role of corporate political 
spending in the form of independent political expenditures. 
 228. See, e.g., W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Mont., 271 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2011). 
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Total cost $2.85 B 
Independent 
Expenditures $37 M 
2008 Election 
Presidential 
Total cost $5.3 B 
Independent 
Expenditures $157 M 
2010 Election 
Midterm 
Total cost $3.6 B 
Independent 
Expenditures $210 M 
2012 Election 
Presidential 




(over $98 M 4/2012) 
 
Corporate political speech raises three distinct concerns. First, cor-
porate political speech is economically motivated speech231 that threatens 
to commoditize the marketplace232 of political and social ideas and en-
deavors. The distorting nature of economically motivated speech is rec-
ognized in other areas of corporate regulation, including the Commercial 
Speech Doctrine,233 and such speech receives a discounted level of pro-
tection under the First Amendment.234 
                                                 
 229. The Money Behind the Elections, supra note 227 (stating the reported costs of the elec-
tions); Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Political Parties, supra note 227. 
 230. Estimated Cost of 2012 Campaign: $6 Billion, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Apr. 8, 2012), http:// 
www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/estimated-cost-of-2012-campaign-6-
billion3276.html. 
 231. Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Cor-
porate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 497, 521–27 (discussing the eco-
nomic motivations of corporate political speech). 
 232. For a discussion of the marketplace of ideas, a metaphor used in free-speech cases, see 
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) and First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 792−95 (1978). 
 233. The Supreme Court established the Commercial Speech Doctrine in Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Cf. Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (establishing prior Supreme Court precedent that commercial 
speech was not protected by the Constitution). Commercial speech includes expressions that propose 
commercial transaction and which are solely tied to the speaker’s or audience’s economic interests, 
or which will likely influence the commercial decisions of consumers. The most common example is 
advertising goods for sale. See 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 812 (2005). 
 234. Commercial speech is recognized under the First Amendment but receives limited consti-
tutional protection. See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation 
Fair Disclosure Unconstitutional? 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 47–60 (2005) (describing the different 
standards of review applied to commercial and noncommercial speech). 
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Second, by interpreting the First Amendment Freedom of Associa-
tion235 Clause to include for-profit corporations,236 corporations have a 
derivative right to speak on behalf of their owners.237 Unlike other forms 
of associations, however, shareholders lack a homogeneous set of inter-
ests and ideals238 outside of interest in economic returns; therefore, when 
speaking derivatively, corporations cannot accurately represent the polit-
ical and social interests of owners and investors.239 
The third concern is the threat of compelled speech on behalf of 
dissenting shareholders.240 Traditionally, dissenting shareholders could 
use corporate democracy measures such as director elections and share-
holder proxy proposals, or as a matter of last resort, choose to sell the 
shares.241 But investment in mutual funds through employer-sponsored 
retirement plans limits these rights because of lack of information,242 
shareholder passivity,243 and limited exit rights.244 Indirect ownership 
                                                 
 235. “The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations 
of citizens, for engaging in political speech . . . .” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 884 
(2010). 
 236. “Political speech is ‘indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy, and this is no less 
true because the speech comes from a corporation.’” Id. (citation omitted). 
 237. See, e.g., id. at 900; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1976); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. 
 238. See, e.g., Anabtawi, supra note 28, at 564 (“This Article disputes the characterization of 
shareholders as having interests that are fundamentally in harmony with one another.”). 
 239. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 231, at 528–34. 
 240. Id. at 535–43. 
 241. “Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate democracy can be 
more effective today because modern technology makes disclosures rapid and informative.”  
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916 (internal citations omitted). “If and when shareholders learn that a 
corporation has been spending general treasury money on objectionable electioneering, they can 
divest.” Id. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 242. “[T]he inherent limitations of the tax law and a recent FEC interpretation of federal cam-
paign finance law led to an unprecedented lack of political transparency in the election cycle.” A 
Guide to the Current Rules for Federal Elections: What Changed in the 2010 Election Cycle, 
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=1187%3Aa-guide-to-the-current-rules-for-federal-elections&catid=48%3Amain&I 
temid=59. For example, under the federal tax code, 501(c)(3) organizations are not required to pub-
licly disclose their donors, even if the organization engages in political speech. “This aspect of the 
tax law is not new; it has just become more salient in light of the surge in spending by corporations 
and outside groups in the 2010 election cycle.” Id. Disclosure of corporate contributions for political 
speech are further hidden by a 2007 Federal Elections Commission formal explanation of its rules 
that “groups running these election ads would have to disclose only those contributions that were 
specifically designated for election ads . . . . In other words, non-disclosure is the default under the 
FEC’s interpretation of the law.” Id.; cf. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 916. 
243. [T]he notion that investors are expected to be largely passive has become well en-
trenched as a matter of law and business practice. In the retail market, mutu-
al funds operate on the assumption that most investors are not interested in getting in-
volved in investment decisions because they are too busy or unqualified. Investors are 
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complicates the traditional market-based remedies of both knowing about 
how corporate money is spent (additional distance between true owners 
and management) and then selling one’s stock if unhappy with the out-
come.245 Additionally, exit can occur only after the speech; thus, share-
holders are left without a preventative remedy against compelled, disa-
greeable speech.246 
The tension between a right to a return on investments (or even the 
simple ability to save for retirement) and the ability to support political 
causes and participate in the democratic process raises a crucial point. 
The conundrum of investors potentially forced to choose between eco-
nomic returns and fidelity to political ideology demonstrates the co-
mingling of economic interests with social and political concerns as 
democratic participants. The number of Americans invested in the mar-
ket elevates the impact of this tension. Even though mutual fund inves-
tors may experience a diluted harm if only one out of 100 companies in a 
fund engages in incongruent speech, the aggregate effect of dissonant 
political speech given the majority of Americans invested in the market 
is hard to ignore.247 
                                                                                                             
considered customers, who buy financial products, rather than active owners 
of investment assets. 
Richardson, supra note 108, at 603. 
 244. See supra notes 135−44 and accompanying text. 
245. Modern technology may help make it easier to track corporate activity, including 
electoral advocacy, but it is utopian to believe that it solves the problem. Most American 
households that own stock do so through intermediaries such as mutual funds and pen-
sion plans, which makes it more difficult both to monitor and to alter particular holdings. 
Studies show that a majority of individual investors make no trades at all during a given 
year. Moreover, if the corporation in question operates a PAC, an investor who sees the 
company’s ads may not know whether they are being funded through the PAC or through 
the general treasury. 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 978 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
246. The injury to the shareholders’ expressive rights has already occurred; they might 
have preferred to keep that corporation’s stock in their portfolio for any number of eco-
nomic reasons; and they may incur a capital gains tax or other penalty from selling their 
shares, changing their pension plan, or the like. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
247. One might argue that the diluted remedy for the mutual fund investor indicates a di-
luted harm to the investor. How harmful can the incongruent speech be when it is only 
from one firm out of one hundred composite firms comprising an index? When a signifi-
cant portion of the voting population is invested in this type of investment vehicle, how-
ever, the aggregate effect of dissonant or incongruent political speech is hard to ig-
nore . . . . Our law recognizes the value of aggregate harms in mechanisms such as class 
action lawsuits and allowing a series of seemingly insignificant breaches over time to 
constitute a material breach. Here too the aggregate harm of incongruent political speech 
should be recognized despite the minimal effect on the rights of the individual citizen-
shareholder. 
Tucker, supra note 231, at 542–43. 
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Infusing public debates with private dollars blurs the lines between 
the public and private functions of corporations. An election stream in-
fused with corporate money is the original context in which I first used 
the phrase citizen shareholder as a means to capture the bifurcated inter-
ests between economic and democratic rights.248 The phrase has been 
expanded here to represent the full scope of interests held by the majority 
of investors who enter the market in mutual funds through employer-
sponsored defined contribution plans. The number of citizens invested in 
the market this way underscores the need for a modernized conceptual-
ization of the shareholder that can take into account the relationship be-
tween economic, social, and political interests. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Departing from the corporate law perspective of internal organiza-
tion and examining the agency paradigm from the perspective of the ma-
jority of American investors reveals that the traditional agency model is 
broken. A litmus test for corporate action is whether or not corporate ac-
tion serves shareholder interests. The traditional agency paradigm seeks 
to align the actions of corporate management with shareholders, but that 
paradigm and the rules developed under it are based on the notion of an 
individual, direct shareholder.249 The current agency paradigm excludes 
the interests of indirect owners and consequently excludes most Ameri-
can investors. Premising corporate law theories and remedies on a model 
that excludes a majority of American investors evokes anti-democratic 
concerns and seems counterintuitive. 
The citizen shareholder should be incorporated into the agency par-
adigm for three reasons. First, a majority of modern investors enter the 
market and purchase mutual funds through employer-sponsored defined 
contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans. The data regarding modern in-
vestments and policy changes to 401(k) plan administration, like auto-
                                                 
 248. Id. at 502 n.14; Anne M. Tucker, Rational Coercion: Citizens United and a Modern Day 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (2011). 
249. The shareholders in whose interests corporations must speak are not the human be-
ings who own (or, more often, on whose behalf other institutions own) the shares. Indeed, 
they are not citizens at all, but rather moments in the market, legal abstractions that have 
interests quite different from those of real citizens in their full complexity. Unlike real 
people, the fictional shareholder is an entirely one-sided abstraction; it seeks to increase 
the value of its shares without regard for any other value. Corporations, then, when they 
act as they are supposed to, pursue only one goal of the many that are important in a civi-
lized society. Corporate agents, in short, work for a principle, not a principal. 
Greenwood, supra note 74, at 1003. 
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matic enrollment, indicate that this trend has a long trajectory and that 
the majority threshold will quickly be surpassed by increasingly more 
investors. 
Second, there are structural constraints in this type of investment 
that weaken, and in some cases, eliminate rights intended to protect 
shareholders and serve as a check on mismanagement. Mutual fund in-
vestors have limited voting, exit, and information rights. As more inves-
tors are grouped in a class of assets with the least mechanisms for choice 
and accountability, one must question the current power balance struck 
in corporate law. Additionally, the nature of what one owns as a mutual 
fund investor is different from what one owns as a direct shareholder so 
that indirect owners bear the risk of ownership (i.e., market decline) 
without the benefit of traditional shareholder rights. These differences 
may make mutual fund holders more concerned with market perfor-
mance as a whole, and more hostile to externalities and risk exposure 
than a direct shareholder. 
Third, corporations perform increasingly public functions that blur 
the lines between public and private, and intertwine economic, social, 
and political interests. Corporate actions have decidedly political and 
social consequences for both investors and non-investors alike. These 
consequences elevate the importance of adequately representing the 
rights of indirect investors in the agency paradigm. With a majority of 
households invested in private entities that serve public functions, ac-
countability is paramount. 
This Article urges a modernization of the traditional agency para-
digm by adopting language that reflects the unique interests of modern 
investors: mutual fund holders in employer-sponsored plans—the citizen 
shareholders. When analyzing whether corporate actions serve the inter-
ests of investors, the agency paradigm must incorporate these indirect 
owners’ interests. Such interests include a preference for policies and 
actions that support broad market performance rather than those that 
promote excessive risk taking or creating externalities. Additionally, ex-
panding the shareholder identity to include the citizen shareholders mod-
ernizes the language and captures the scope of investments, the purposes 
served, and the consequences of corporate action that are broader than 
the daily rise or fall of an individual company (or fund) share price.250 
                                                 
 250. The final chapter in Berle and Means’s The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
focused on this very point. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 7, at 352–57 (“More slow, but equally sure 
is the development of social pressure demanding that the [corporate] power shall be used for the 
benefit of all concerns. This pressure, constant in ecclesiastical and political history, is already mak-
ing its appearance in many guises in the economic field.”); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 
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Corporate law scholarship has long advocated for incorporating such in-
terests;251 this Article suggests that one way to incorporate these broader 
interests is to reconceptualize the identity of the shareholder within the 
traditional agency paradigm. Thus, the definition of shareholder expands 
and the framework evolves to reflect the investment realities for a major-
ity of American investors. 
At this stage, the approach of the citizen shareholder is conceptual, 
not procedural, and is a starting point for thinking about how to infuse 
traditional corporate law models with current economic realities. Perhaps 
more importantly, this project looks outside the walls of corporations and 
asks how and why individuals invest in the market and how can (or 
should) corporate law respect, incorporate, and serve the interests of 
modern investors. Current corporate law debates are largely divorced 
from the reality of how over 90 million Americans who, typically 
through a system of confined choice and encouraged by tax incentives, 
link their individual financial security with private, corporate actions. 
The implicit trust placed upon corporate actions by both individuals in-
vesting in this fashion and our society as a whole merits the acknowl-
edgment and inclusion of those interests within the agency paradigm. 
Conceptualizing this class of 401(k) investors as the citizen shareholder, 
and modernizing the agency paradigm to accommodate these investors’ 
interests—primarily in market stability to secure retirement savings—is a 
step in the right direction. 
  
                                                                                                             
34, at 851–52 (describing the evolution of Berle’s vision of the form and function of corporations to 
one where corporate entities had social responsibilities, even though how such duties would be in-
corporated into the governance model was not then clear). 
 251. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 8; see also Ho, supra note 8; Taub, supra note 5, at 
860 (“[T]hose with a stakeholder perspective see corporate accountability more broadly. They would 
claim that corporations need to serve all important stakeholders, beyond just shareholders . . . em-
ployees, suppliers, customers, the local community, the environment, future generations, and per-
haps anyone impacted significantly by externalities resulting from corporate operations.”). 
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Appendix 
Table 7: Top Economies of the World in 2010 
 
Rank Economy GDP/ Revenue252 Rank Economy 
GDP/ 
Revenue  
1 United States  14,582,400 24 Wal-Mart Stores  408,214 
2 China  5,878,629 25 Venezuela, RB  387,852 
3 Japan 5,497,813 26 Austria  376,162 
4 Germany  3,309,669 27 Saudi Arabia 375,766 
5 France  2,560,002 28 Argentina 368,712 
6 United Kingdom  2,246,079 29 South Africa 363,704 
7 Brazil  2,087,890 30 Iran, Islamic Rep. 331,015 
8 Italy 2,051,412 31 Thailand  318,847 
9 India  1,729,010 32 Denmark  310,405 
10 Canada 1,574,052 33 Greece 304,865 
11 Russian Federation  1,479,819 34 Colombia  288,189 
12 Spain 1,407,405 35 Royal Dutch Shell 285,129 
13 Mexico 1,039,662 36 Exxon Mobil 284,650 
14 Korea, Rep.  1,014,483 37 BP 246,106 
15 Australia  924,843 38 Finland 238,801 
16 Netherlands 783,413 39 Malaysia  237,804 
17 Turkey  735,264 40 United Arab Emirates  230,252 
18 Indonesia  706,558 41 Portugal  228,538 
19 Switzerland  523,772 42 Hong Kong SAR, China  224,458 
20 Poland 468,585 43 Singapore  222,699 
21 Belgium 467,472 44 Egypt, Arab Rep. 218,912 
22 Sweden  458,004 45 Israel  217,334 
23 Norway  414,462 46 Toyota Motor 204,106 
 
                                                 
 252. Revenue listed in millions of U.S. dollars. Gross domestic product 2010, WORLD BANK 
(July 1, 2011), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP.pdf (Rank-
ing national economies by millions of U.S. dollars); Global 500 List, CNN MONEY (July 26, 2010), 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/full_list/. Ranking compiled by author; 
corporate revenue confirmed for U.S.-traded companies based on 10K filings in 2011 for year-end 
2010 (on file with the author). 
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Rank Economy GDP/ Revenue Rank Economy 
GDP/ 
Revenue  
47 Ireland 203,892 73 New Zealand 126,679 
48 Chile 203,443 74 Assicurazioni Generali 126,012 
49 Japan Post  Holdings 202,196 75 Allianz 125,999 
50 Philippines  199,589 76 AT&T 123,018 
51 Nigeria  193,669 77 Carrefour 121,452 
52 Czech Republic 192,152 78 Ford Motor 118,308 
53 Sinopec 187,518 79 ENI 117,235 
54 State Grid 184,496 80 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 115,632 
55 AXA 175,257 81 Hewlett-Packard 114,552 
56 Pakistan  174,799 82 E.ON 113,849 
57 China National Petroleum 165,496 83 
Berkshire  
Hathaway 112,493 
58 Chevron 163,527 84 GDF Suez 111,069 
59 ING Group 163,204 85 Daimler 109,700 
60 Romania  161,624 86 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone 109,656 
61 Algeria  159,426 87 Samsung  Electronics 108,927 
62 General Electric 156,779 88 Citigroup 108,785 
63 Total S.A. 155,887 89 McKesson 108,702 
64 Peru  153,845 90 Verizon Communications 107,808 
65 Bank of America Corp. 150,450 91 Crédit Agricole 106,538 
66 Volkswagen 146,205 92 Banco Santander 106,345 
67 Kuwait 148,024 93 General Motors 104,589 
68 Kazakhstan 142,987 94 HSBC Holdings 103,736 
69 ConocoPhillips 139,515 95 Siemens 103,605 
70 Ukraine  137,929 96 Vietnam 103,572 





72 Hungary 130,419 98 Lloyds Banking Group 102,967 
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Rank Economy GDP/ Revenue Rank Economy 
GDP/ 
Revenue  
99 Bangladesh 100,076 124 Iraq  82,150 
100 Cardinal Health 99,613 125 Nissan Motor 80,963 
101 Nestlé 99,114 126 Pemex 80,722 
102 CVS Caremark 98,729 127 Panasonic 79,893 
103 Wells Fargo 98,636 128 Proctor & Gamble 79,697 
104 Qatar 98,313 129 LG 78,892 





95,758 131 Sony 77,696 
107 Dexia Group 95,144 132 Kroger 76,733 
108 Gazprom 94,472 133 Groupe BPCE 76,464 
109 Honda Motor 92,400 134 Prudential 75,010 
110 Electricité de France 92,204 135 Munich Re Group 74,764 
111 Aviva 92,140 136 Statoil 74,000 
112 Petrobras 91,869 137 Nippon Life  Insurance 72,051 
113 Royal Bank of Scotland 91,767 138 
AmerisourceBer-
gen 71,789 
114 Morocco  91,196 a 139 China Mobile Communications 71,749 
115 PDVSA 91,182 140 Hyundai Motor 71,678 
116 Metro 91,152 141 Costco  Wholesale 71,422 
117 Tesco 90,234 142 Vodafone 70,899 
118 Deutsche  Telekom 89,794 143 BASF 70,461 
119 Enel 89,329 144 BMW 70,444 
120 Slovak Republic 89,034 145 Zurich Financial Services 70,272 
121 United Health Group 87,123 146 Valero Energy 70,035 
122 Angola  84,391 147 Fiat 69,639 
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Bank of China 
69,295 156 Peugeot 67,297 
150 Archer Daniels Midland 69,207 157 CNP Assurances 66,556 
151 Toshiba 68,731 158 Barclays 66,533 
152 Legal & General Group 68,290 159 Home Depot 66,176 
153 Boeing 68,281 160 Target 65,357 
154 U.S. Postal Service 68,090 161 ArcelorMittal 65,110 
155 Lukoil 68,025 162 WellPoint 65,028 
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Table 8: Top 100 Corporations by Revenue in 2010 
 
Rank Company Revenues253 Stock Exchange254 
1 Wal-Mart Stores 408,214 NYSE 
2 Royal Dutch Shell 285,129 NYSE 
3 Exxon Mobil 284,650 NYSE 
4 BP 246,106 NYSE 
5 Toyota Motor 204,106 NYSE 
6 Japan Post Holdings 202,196 Not on U.S. exchange 
7 Sinopec Financial Holdings Co. Ltd. 187,518
Not on U.S. 
exchange 
8 State Grid Corp. of Chi-na 184,496 Gov’t Owned 
9 AXA 175,257 NYSE Euronext 
10 China National Petroleum 165,496
Not on U.S. 
exchange 
11 Chevron 163,527 NYSE 
                                                 
 253. Revenue is listed in millions of U.S. dollars. Global 500 List, supra note 252. Ranking 
compiled by author; corporate revenue confirmed for U.S.-traded companies based on 10K filings in 
2011 for year-end 2010 (on file with the author). 
 254. Exchange listing information obtained from exchange-based databases of listing compa-
nies. Exchanges searched included the NYSE Euronext, Listing Directory, NYSE EURONEXT (2012), 
http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_ny_name_A.html?ListedComp, as well as the NASDAQ, 
Company List (NASDAQ, NYSE, & AMEX), NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/company-
list.aspx. Data compiled by author. 
A securities exchange is a U.S.-registered exchange if it files with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission under Section 6 of the 1934 Act: 
An exchange may be registered as a national securities exchange under the terms and 
conditions hereinafter provided in this section and in accordance with the provisions of 
section 19(a) of this title, by filing with the Commission an application for registration in 
such form as the Commission, by rule, may prescribe containing the rules of the ex-
change and such other information and documents as the Commission, by rule, may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78f (2010). Registered securities exchanges include the following: NYSE Amex; BATS 
Exchange, Inc.; BATS Y. Exchange, Inc.; NASDAQ OMX-BX, Inc. (formerly Boston); C2 Options 
Exchange, Inc.; Chicago Board Options Exchange, Inc.; Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.; EDGA 
Exchange, Inc.; EDGX Exchange, Inc.; International SEC Exchange, LLC; the Nasdaq Stock Mar-
ket, LLC; National Stock Exchange, Inc.; New York Stock Exchange, LLC (referred to in Table 8 as 
the “NYSE”); NYSE Arca, Inc.; and NASDAQ OMX PHLX, Inc. (formerly Philadelphia Stock 
Exchange). Exchanges, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divi 
sions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml. For a complete listing of international stock exchanges, see 
Aldas Kirvaitis, Stock Exchanges Worldwide Links, http://www.tdd.lt/slnews/Stock_Exchanges 
/Stock.Exchanges.htm (last visited May 8, 2012). 
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12 ING Group 163,204 Euronext 
13 General Electric 156,779 NYSE 
14 Total S.A. 155,887 NYSE Euronext 
15 Bank of America Corp. 150,450 NYSE 
16 Volkswagen 146,205 Not on U.S. exchange  
17 Conoco Phillips 139,515 NYSE 
18 BNP Paribas 130,708 NYSE Euronext 
19 Assicurazioni Generali 126,012 MP 
20 Allianz 125,999 ADR
255 
on NYSE 
21 AT&T 123,018 NYSE 
22 Carrefour 121,452 Euronext 
23 Ford Motor 118,308 NYSE 
24 ENI 117,235 ADR on NYSE 
25 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 115,632 NYSE 
26 Hewlett-Packard 114,552 NYSE 
27 E.ON 113,849 Not on U.S. exchange 
                                                 
 255. ADR stands for American Depository Receipt: 
ADRs can be called American Depository Receipts, Global Depository Receipts . . . . A 
security issued by a depository against a deposit of stock held in the local market-
place . . . . [W]hen we’re talking about an ADR, we’re talking about a security where the 
ADR and the ADS is registered with the SEC, at least marginally, and trades publicly in 
the United States . . . . 
Remarks of Harry Wellington, Dean of the New York Law School, The Russian Securities Markets: 
Regulation and Practice, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (1998); see also ADR Basics: 
What is an ADR?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/university/adr/adr1.asp#axzz1m6 
ZODLIU (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (“An American depository receipt (ADR) is a stock that trades 
in the United States but represents a specified number of shares in a foreign corporation. ADRs are 
bought and sold on American markets just like regular stocks, and are issued/sponsored in the U.S. 
by a bank or brokerage.”). 
Additionally, some foreign-owned securities are referred to as American Depository Shares or 
ADS: 
A U.S. dollar-denominated equity share of a foreign-based company available 
for purchase on an American stock exchange. American Depositary Shares (ADSs) are 
issued by depository banks in the U.S. under agreement with the issuing foreign compa-
ny; the entire issuance is called an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) and the individ-
ual shares are referred to as ADSs. 
American Depository Share—ADS, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/ads.asp#ix 
zz1m6aBMcqD (last visited May 8, 2012). 
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28 Berkshire Hathaway 112,493 NYSE 
29 GDF Suez 111,069 NYSE Euronext 
30 Daimler 109,700 Not on U.S. exchange 
31 Nippon Telegraph &  Telephone 109,656 NYSE 
32 Samsung Electronics 108,927 Not on U.S. exchange 
33 Citigroup 108,785 NYSE 
34 McKesson 108,702 NYSE 
35 Verizon Communications 107,808 NYSE 
36 Crédit Agricole 106,538 NYSE Euronext 
37 Banco Santander 106,345 NYSE 
38 General Motors 104,589 NYSE 
39 HSBC Holdings 103,736 NYSE 
40 Siemens 103,605 ADR on NYSE 
41 American International Group (AIG) 103,189 NYSE 
42 Lloyds Banking Group 102,967 NYSE 
43 Cardinal Health 99,613 NYSE 
44 Nestlé 99,114 ADR on NYSE 
45 CVS Caremark 98,729 NYSE 
46 Wells Fargo 98,636 NYSE 
47 Hitachi 96,593 ADR on NYSE 
48 International Business  Machines (IBM) 95,758 NYSE 
49 Dexia Group 95,144 Euronext 
50 Gazprom 94,472 Not on U.S. exchange 
51 Honda Motor 92,400 Not on U.S. exchange 
52 Electricité de France 92,204 Euronext 
53 Aviva 92,140 NYSE 
54 Petrobras 91,869 Not on U.S. exchange 
55 Royal Bank of Scotland 91,767 ADR by NYSE 
56 PDVSA 91,182 Not on U.S. exchange 
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57 Metro A.G. 91,152 Not on U.S. exchange 
58 Tesco 90,234 Not on U.S. exchange 
59 Deutsche Telekom 89,794 Not on U.S. exchange 
60 Enel 89,329 Not on U.S. exchange 
61 United Health Group 87,138 NYSE 
62 Société Générale 84,157 ARS on Euronext 
63 Nissan Motor 80,963 OTC by ADR 
64 Pemex 80,722 Gov’t owned 
65 Panasonic 79,893 NYSE 
66 Proctor & Gamble 79,697 NYSE 
67 LG 78,892 Not on U.S. exchange 
68 Telefónica 78,853 ADR by NYSE 
69 Sony 77,696 NYSE 
70 Kroger 76,733 NYSE 
71 Groupe BPCE 76,464 Privately owned  
72 Prudential 75,010 NYSE 
73 Munich Re Group 74,764 Not on U.S. exchange 
74 Statoil 74,000 NYSE 
75 Nippon Life Insurance 72,051 Not on U.S. exchange 
76 AmericsourceBergen 71,789 NYSE 
77 China Mobile Communi-cations 71,749
Not on U.S. 
exchange 
78 Hyundai Motor 71,678 Not on U.S. exchange 
79 Costco Wholesale 71,422 NASDAQ 
80 Vodafone 70,899 NASDAQ 
81 BASF 70,461 Not on U.S. exchange 
82 BMW 70,444 Not on U.S. exchange 
1364 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 35:1299 
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83 Zurich Financial Services A.G. 70,272
Not on U.S. 
exchange 
84 Valero Energy 70,035 NYSE 
85 Fiat 69,639 ADR on NYSE 
86 Deutsche Post 69,427 Not on U.S. exchange 
87 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China 69,295
Not on U.S. 
exchange 
88 Archer Daniels Midland 69,207 NYSE 
89 Toshiba 68,731 Not on U.S. exchange 
90 Legal & General Group 68,290 Not on U.S. exchange 
91 Boeing 68,281 NYSE 
92 U.S. Postal Service 68,090 Gov’t owned 
93 Lukoil 68,025 Not on U.S. exchange 
94 Peugeot 67,297 Euronext 
95 CNP Assurances 66,556 Euronext 
96 Barclays 66,533 ADR on NYSE 
97 Home Depot 66,176 NYSE 
98 Target 65,357 NYSE 
99 ArcelorMittal 65,110 Euronext 
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Table 9: Top Corporate, Mutual Fund, and Government Institutional  











1. Vanguard  
(86M shares) 
1. Berkshire Hathaway 
(64M shares) 
2. Vanguard  
(15.15M shares) 
3. Berkshire Hathaway 3. Vanguard 3. Fidelity  
4. BlackRock258 4. Blackrock 7. BlackRock 
8. Fidelity  8. Fidelity  9. Oppenheimer 
11. BlackRock  10. BlackRock 10. T. Rowe Price  
13. BlackRock  11. Bank of America 14. BlackRock 
14. Bank of America 12. JP Morgan Chase 18. BlackRock 
16. Legal & General 
Group 13. BlackRock 24. BlackRock 
18. JP Morgan Chase 14. TIAA-CREF 30. TIAA-CREF 
20. TIAA-CREF 20. BlackRock 32. Bank of America 
21. CALPERS 22. T. Rowe Price 43. BlackRock 
26. T. Rowe Price 25. Legal & General Group 
47. Legal & General 
Group 
29. BlackRock  36. Wells Fargo 48. JP Morgan Chase 
33. N.Y. State 
Common Ret. Fund 
38. N.Y. State 
Common Ret. Fund  
49. N.Y. State 
Common Ret. Fund 
41. N.Y. Teachers’  
Ret. Sys. 40. CALPERS 53. CALPERS 
45. AXA 43. N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 61. BlackRock 
   
                                                 
 256. These data reflected in this table were hand-collected by the author based on publicly 
available 13f filings for the case study companies. (on file with author). 
         257. Institutional investors are listed in rank order by size of holdings, from largest to smallest 
until the cut-off threshold of 200,000 shares of the company is met.  The number next to the institu-
tional investor name indicates the rank of that investor among all institutional investors, not just 
those included in this table.  Institutional investors included in this table are (a) one of the top 100 
companies, (b) one of the top mutual funds discussed in this Article, or (c) a pension fund associated 
with a state or municipal government in the U.S. 
         258. Note, there are several different BlackRock funds, and as well other institutional inves-
tors, that hold stock under different registered entities operating under the corporate parent umbrella.  
For purposes of this table, the parent company is identified and given a separate entry for each 13F 
filing that demonstrated holdings over 200,000 shares in the case study companies in 2010. 










50. Allianz 48. BlackRock 68. N.Y. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 
64. Fla. State Bd. of 
Admin. 52. Citigroup 
72. State Teachers Ret. 
Sys. of Ohio 
66. Cal. State 
Teachers’ Ret. Sys.  
53. Fla. State Bd. of 
Admin.  
94. Cal. State 
Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 
68. Wells Fargo 58. AXA  98. AXA  
69. BlackRock  59. Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. 
103. State of Wis. Inv. 
Bd. 
75. BlackRock  63. Oppenheimer Funds 
111. Emps. Ret. Sys. 
of Tex. 
79. State of Wis. Inv. 
Bd. 66. BlackRock  114. HSBC 
83. ING 67. State of Wis. Inv. Bd. 
123. Ohio Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys.  
90. Wells Fargo  70. Wells Fargo 129. Credit Agricolé 
91. Citigroup   75. Credit Agricolé 134. Wells Fargo 
99. BlackRock  79. Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. 
145. State of N.J. 
Common Pension Fund 
106. Credit Agricolé 80. BlackRock  151. Barclays 
109. State of N.J. 
Common Pension Fund
81. State Teachers’ 
Ret. Sys. of Ohio 172. AXA 
112. Ohio Pub. Emp. 
Ret. Sys. 82. HSBC 
183. Colo. Pub. Emps.’ 
Ret. Ass’n 
113. State Teachers’ 
Ret. Sys. of Ohio 
88. Colo. Pub. Emps.’ 
Ret. Ass’n 
191. Tex. Permanent 
Sch. Fund  
116. HSBC 89. N.J. Div. of Inv. 196. ING 
127. Oppenheimer 
Fund  95. General Electric 
198. State Treasurer of 
Mich.  
133. Tex. Teacher Ret. 
Sys. 99. Allianz  
137. Va. Ret. Sys. 111. BNP   
146. State Treasurer of 
Mich.  
120. Royal Bank of 
Scotland   
151. Colo. Pub. Emps.’ 
Ret. Ass’n  
124. Tex. Teacher Ret. 
Sys.  
   











159. Tex. Permanent 
Sch. Fund 125. ING  
169. Allianz 129. Tex. Permanent Sch. Fund   
173. IBM 130. IBM   
197. Emps. Ret. Sys. of 
Tex.  
144. State Treasurer of 
Mich.  
229. Pub. Sector 
Pension Inv. Bd. 
146. Emps. Ret. Sys. of 
Tex.  
236. Royal Bank of 
Scotland 171. AIG  
242. AIG 200. Ky. Teachers’ Ret. Sys.  
245. INC 204. Commonwealth of Pa. Pub. Schs.  
246. Commonwealth 
of Pa. Pub. Schs. 236. Allianz  
249. Exxon 256. BNP  
262. Fidelity 273. AIG  
275. Allianz 275. Va. Ret. Sys.  
283. Ky. Teachers’ 
Ret. Sys.   
308. N.M. Educ. Ret. 
Bd.   
309. BP   
341. AXA   
343. AIG   
355. Or. Pub. Emps. 
Ret. Sys.   
377. Wells Fargo   
389. BNP   
391. Wells Fargo    
 
